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11 Introduction
1.1 Background
The commissionaire structure is an operating model well-known for its tax planning features.
Commissionaire arrangements have been widely used by multinational enterprises (MNE)
engaged in the business of selling and distributing tangible goods, since the late 1980s. A
commissionaire distributor is best described as a hybrid between a traditional distributor and
an agent. In the eyes of the customer, the commissionaire operates just like any distributor—
in its own name. However, in relation to a foreign group company, the commissionaire
operates on its behalf, like an agent, thus not taking title to the goods sold.
Tax planners have characterized the commissionaire arrangement as the “next best thing to
not paying taxes at all”.1 Policy-makers, on the other hand, generally consider these
arrangements put in place to erode the taxable base of the state where sales took place.2
Fundamentally, the commissionaire arrangement is by no means abusive. Commissionaires
operate as middlemen between vendors and buyers. However, this hybrid between a
traditional distributor and an agent has certain characteristics in relation to tax law
provisions, which have proven to be significant.
The key relevance of the commissionaire arrangement in taxation is that it enables
distribution in the customers’ jurisdiction without respective taxable presence. Under a duly
established commissionaire arrangement, a MNE will not constitute a permanent
establishment (PE) in the state concerned. In a broader context, the key relevance of a PE to
an internationally operating enterprise is that under most tax treaties, the business profits of
a foreign enterprise are taxable in a state only to the extent that the enterprise concerned has
a PE to which profits are attributable.
The question of fair allocation of taxing rights between the source state and the residence
state has challenged policy-makers for a long time. The PE concept, which is key in this
discussion, has been an area of controversy for years. Traditionally PEs are constituted
where an enterprise has a substantial physical presence in the state concerned. In addition, it
is generally accepted that an enterprise should be treated as having a deemed PE by virtue
1 See Swanick et al. 1997, p. 137.
2 See OECD 2014b, p. 6.
2of its activities, where another person acts for that enterprise. However, the characterization
of an agency PE and setting the threshold on PE-constituting activities has turned out to be
challenging.
The Group of Twenty (G20) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) have recently carried out extensive work to fight base erosion and
profit shifting (BEPS). Under the BEPS initiative, tax avoidance is fought on multiple fronts.
PE-avoiding commissionaire arrangements are also targeted. A Multilateral Convention to
Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent BEPS (MLI) has been recently issued
and has been open for signature as of 31 December 2016. Therefore, swift implementation
of treaty measures to update international tax rules is foreseeable.
Under these circumstances, MNEs are under pressure to re-evaluate their existing operating
models. The application of updated tax treaty provisions may have an effect on the taxation
of business profits. The forthcoming changes may also render existing structures sub-optimal
for other reasons. Effects far broader than those on income taxation are also possible.
Therefore, an in-depth analysis on the current situation, forthcoming changes to provisions
of tax treaty law, and possible next steps, is necessary.
1.2 Purpose and scope of the study
The primary research question to be answered in this study is whether and how will the new
agency PE provisions set forth in OECD BEPS Action 7 affect existing commissionaire
distributor arrangements.3 The study seeks to systematize and analyze the current tax
position of commissionaire distributors and the forthcoming amendments to double tax
conventions (DTC). In addition, the definition of PE in Finnish national legislation is studied
in light of the new tax treaty definition of PE. The study seeks to answer whether the current
national PE concept is compatible with Action 7 provisions and to highlight relevant issues
relating particularly to the commissionaire distributor model. Further, a solution with regard
to the required changes to the definition of PE in Finnish national legislation is set forth.
The results of this study are to serve as a systematization of the current PE concept and the
forthcoming changes to the PE concept with regard to commissionaires. Furthermore, the
3 OECD BEPS Action 7: Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Establishment Status. See OECD
2015d.
3study seeks to highlight the practical implications of the forthcoming changes for MNEs
operating via a commissionaire distributor arrangement in Finland.
This study will focus on related-party commissionaire distributor arrangements, put in place
for the distribution and sale of finished tangible goods. A commissionaire distributor can be
defined as an indirect agent engaged in the business of distributing the products of an
enterprise by entering into sales contracts in its own name but on behalf of another enterprise.
The concept is further defined in Chapter 2. The focus is on the income tax aspects of the
commissionaire distributor model, primarily its ability to avoid PE status.
Profit shifting caused by artificial avoidance of PE status can be countered in multiple ways.
In addition to lowering the PE threshold, other measures are also available for tax
administrations and policy-makers. Profit shifting caused by the avoidance of PE status can
be fought, inter alia, by applying transfer pricing (TP) provisions. A balanced allocation of
tax revenues can be achieved by restructuring non-arm’s length transactions under TP rules.4
The possibility of tax administrations seeking to apply general anti-avoidance rules (GAAR)
to find PEs cannot be completely ruled out either.5 However, no published Finnish case law
supports the application of a GAAR to commissionaire structures. Prominent European case
law does not support such application of GAARs either. In fact, GAARs fit rather poorly for
the purpose of countering the avoidance of PE status.6 Above all, the BEPS initiative shows
a clear preference for lowering the PE threshold to fight commissionaire arrangements.
Therefore, this study is concerned with the reduction of the PE threshold.
Other group structures, which may be used in connection with the commissionaire
distributor model, such as the migration of intellectual property to a holding company, toll
manufacturing arrangements and maintaining a stock of distributable goods in the
customers’ jurisdiction, cannot be studied in this context. These arrangements encompass
unique characteristics and issues which are loosely related to those discussed in this study.
For the same reasons, auxiliary or preparatory activities are not studied either. Rather, the
4 See Section 31 of the Act on Assessment Procedure (1041/2006; VML), which includes a special profit
adjustment provision.
5 See  Section  28  of  the  VML  (1558/1995)  for  the  Finnish  GAAR,  which  allows  re-characterization  of
transactions and levying a tax based on the real nature of the arrangement.
6 Fundamentally, the PE concept is only a threshold which determines whether the source state or the residence
state has a right to levy a tax on the taxpayer’s income. In fact, source state taxation is an exception to the
general rule of income taxation in the taxpayer’s residence state. Avoiding PE constitution will not itself result
in tax avoidance.
4study is concerned with fully operative commissionaire distributor models. The attribution
of income, TP between the commissionaire and its principal, the elimination of double
taxation or the application of anti-avoidance provisions are also beyond the scope of this
study. PEs for purposes of value added tax (VAT) and customs matters are not studied in
this context either.
The study is primarily concerned with tax treaty situations where an OECD Model-based
treaty is applicable. A tax treaty situation can be defined as a situation where a tax object
simultaneously has a connection with more than one state and a bilateral or multilateral tax
treaty is applicable. However, also non-tax treaty situations and treaties based on the UN
and US Models are studied where relevant.7
1.3 Research methods
The approach of the study is that of a traditional legal study. Therefore, the legal dogmatic
method is applied as a primary research method. Hence, the study is primarily concerned
with the interpretation and systematization of existing legal norms—de lege lata.8
MNEs operate cross-border and in a vast number of jurisdictions with different legal systems
and traditions. Therefore, an international perspective is essential. To be able to answer the
primary research question, a comparative method is used in conjunction with the dogmatic
method. Furthermore, foreign legal literature is made use of where the study is concerned
with the interpretation of internationally uniform legal norms, such as the provisions of The
OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital (OECD Model).
The comparative approach of this study is solely problem-based and the results are to serve
practical purposes rather than theoretical purposes. Comparative information is to serve as a
constructive tool and is used to support interpretative solutions where domestic case law or
other primary sources of law are not available. Comparison in this study is primarily
functional, concerned with how the same or very similar legal problems have been resolved
in other jurisdictions. Jurisdictions in comparison are chosen based on the functional
equivalences available within the field of study.9
7 United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing Countries, 2011
update; United States Model Income Tax Convention, 2016 update.
8 See Hirvonen 2011, pp. 21–26.
9 See Husa 2013, pp. 36–148.
5As a basic methodological solution, the comparative method is used on macro and micro
levels. Legal traditions, namely the civil law and common law traditions, are compared on a
macro level. On a micro level, a comparison is drawn to Sweden and other European
jurisdictions where relevant case law is available and legal norms are equivalent to a relevant
extent and similarly interpreted to those in Finland.10
Finally, commissionaire structures are generally tax-motivated. The underlying motivations
and rationale of MNEs as taxpayers are also of interest. The commissionaire distributor
model can only be understood in this context. Therefore, the current legal state and
forthcoming changes thereto are also analyzed from a tax planning perspective.
1.4 Earlier studies and materials
The PE concept has been of interest to legislators, legal academics, and taxpayers for the
better part of the 20th and 21st century. Discussion on the matter has also been active within
the OECD, G20, EU, and UN. Therefore, a substantial amount of legislative material,
articles in tax and legal journals, European case law, and other research material is available
on the subject.
The current tax position of commissionaire distributor models is studied in light of the 2014
OECD Model and the respective Commentary as they read on 15 July 2014. The primary
source of interpretation with regard to the proposed amendments to tax treaties is the OECD
BEPS Action 7 Final Report (Final Report), published 5 October 2015. Proposals set forth
in Action 7, which specifically target the commissionaire, have also been included in the
text of the MLI.11
There is little domestic case law or domestic legal literature available on commissionaire
structures.12 Unlike many other European supreme courts, PE constitution on the basis of
the activities of a commissionaire distributor or a dependent agent has not been subject to
the Finnish Supreme Court’s (KHO) considerations. Furthermore, domestic tax law
provisions regarding the constitution of a PE have been previously revised over 20 years
10 See Husa 2013, pp. 36–148.
11 See OECD 2015.
12 See Aalto 2002, Malmgrén 2008 and KVL 1996/68 (same as KHO 7.6.1996 T 1928).
6ago. Hence, the position of a commissionaire distributor has not been comprehensively
analyzed in a domestic legal study either.
1.5 Sources of law and theoretical basis of interpretation
The interpretation of the current PE threshold relies heavily on the interpretation of DTCs.
Therefore, the discussion on the tax treatment of commissionaire arrangements has mostly
focused on the interpretation of Article 5(5) of the OECD Model, i.e. the agency PE rule,
and the respective OECD Commentary to the Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital
(Commentary). These sources are without a doubt among the most important with respect to
this study. However, to answer the research question, a broader analysis of the sources of
law is necessary.
1.5.1 Domestic doctrine
A Nordic doctrine on the sources of law is well-established in the Finnish legal tradition.
Sources of law are divided into strongly binding sources of law, weakly binding sources of
law and allowed sources of law.13 Section 81 of the Finnish Constitution (731/1999) requires
that state tax is governed by an act, wherein provisions on the grounds for tax liability, the
amount of tax, and provisions on the legal protection of the taxpayer are included. Further,
these provisions should be accurate and precise, leaving little room for interpretation.14
Therefore, the emphasized principle of legality, arising out of Section 81, requires that the
wording of the provision is a primary and strongly binding source of law. Preparatory works
and case law are considered weakly binding sources of law.15 Legal doctrine, legal
principles, and guidance issued by the Finnish Tax Administration are allowed sources of
law.16
The Nordic doctrine on the sources of law should not be understood as a closed system.17
The Europeanization of the Finnish legal system requires that EU law provisions, including
13 Määttä 2014, pp. 8–22.
14 See HE 1/1998 vp, p. 134.
15 Published case law of the Supreme Administrative Court of Finland (KHO) is considered primary to the
advance rulings of the Central Tax Board of Finland (KVL).
16 Määttä 2014, pp. 14–16; For clarification, Finnish Tax Administration’s publications are not legally binding
sources of law. Furthermore, with regard to PE rules, the guidance mostly repeats what is stated in the OECD
Commentary; See Verohallinto 2014.
17 See Määttä 2014, pp. 18–19.
7non-discrimination provisions and basic freedoms, are taken into account. Furthermore,
foreign case law can be accepted as an allowed source of law, especially in situations where
the national provisions interpreted correspond to the provisions interpreted in the foreign
case concerned.18 For example, interpretation of the provisions of double tax conventions
(DTC), which are based on the OECD Model, in accordance with European case law may
be well-founded. However, foreign court cases are approached with some caution to avoid
misinterpretations.19
1.5.2 International context
In practice, the interpretation of DTCs and EU law is the cornerstone of international tax
law. However, domestic law provisions shall not be overlooked. Aside from EU tax law,
international tax law is not supranational legislation. Rather, it is a part of the domestic
legislation of each country. Unlike other provisions of private international law, DTCs are
not concerned with choosing between the application of domestic and foreign law
provisions. DTCs and domestic tax rules are concurrently relevant, as DTCs are only
concerned with limiting the content of domestic tax law by excluding the application of
domestic tax law provisions or by obliging the other state to eliminate double taxation.20
DTCs cannot be the ground to levy a tax. Instead, a state tax must be governed by an act of
Parliament.21
International taxation operates in a multi-level system, wherein EU law, DTCs, and
provisions of domestic tax law apply side-by-side.22 This traditional understanding is about
to change slightly. The MLI will add an additional layer above bilateral DTCs. Therefore,
more than ever before, the precedence in relation to one another must be resolved. EU law
provisions take precedence over domestic law provisions as well as provisions of the MLI
18 See Määttä 2014, p. 271.
19 The use of foreign case law has traditionally been approached with particular caution. See KKO 2012:35,
where the Finnish Supreme Court’s (KKO) decision was based on Swedish case law, however, without direct
reference; See Husa 2013, p. 81.
20 In Finland double taxation is eliminated either by granting credit for foreign-paid taxes or by exemption
from domestic taxation; See Reimer – Rust 2015 pp. 23–29 on the relationship of DTCs and private
international law.
21 On the first point see Vapaavuori 2013 p.17; See Reimer – Rust 2015, p. 30 on similar provisions in
Switzerland, the US, the UK, and Germany.
22 In the Finnish legal system, DTCs are not self-executing. DTCs must be enacted into domestic law before
treaty benefits can be given to treaty subjects.
8and DTCs.23 The relationship between DTCs and domestic tax law provisions is more
complex.
As a general principle, DTC provisions take precedence over domestic tax law provisions in
conflict situations. This applies where the application of the treaty provisions result in a more
favorable result for the taxpayer concerned.24 In any other case, taxation will conform to the
applicable domestic law taxation, because DTCs cannot be the ground for levying a tax.
Not all DTCs are based on the OECD Model. As for the Finnish DTC network, most DTCs
with developing countries are based on the UN Model. The more asymmetric the economic
relations between the two states are, the more relevant the threshold for source state income
taxation becomes. A high or otherwise easily avoidable PE threshold may deprive the
developing countries’ tax revenues. Therefore, evaluation of the agency PE concept also in
light of the UN Model is well-founded. In essence, the OECD Model and the UN Model are
based on the same fundamentals and their wordings are very similar. Therefore, deviations
from the provisions of the OECD Model are mentioned in this study, where necessary.25 In
other respects, the models are considered to coincide.
1.5.3 Interpretation of treaty terms
Most of the treaty terms have not been explicitly defined in DTCs. Moreover, some DTC
provisions include explicit references to the meaning of terms under domestic law. Where
such reference is not explicitly provided, Article 3(2) of the OECD Model provides that any
term not defined in the DTC shall be given the meaning that it would have according to the
applicable domestic tax law provisions, unless the context requires otherwise. Article 3(2)
requires ambulatory interpretation, i.e. refers to domestic provisions applicable when the
treaty is applied.26
23 See Terra – Wattel 2012 pp. 115–120 on the primacy and direct effect of EU law.
24 See Vapaavuori 2003, p. 17; Similarly Helminen 2016, Chapter ”Fundamentals of International Tax Law”,
“Concept of International Tax Law”, “Relationship among the Legal Systems of International Tax Law”, “Tax
Treaties and Domestic Tax Law”.
25 The commentary on the UN Model has not generally been used for interpretation of tax treaties by Finnish
courts. Therefore, the commentaries on the UN Model are not comprehensively studied in this context.
26 In the context of Article 3(2), a relevant question is whether the Article refers to the domestic law provisions
in force at the time when the treaty was concluded (static interpretation) or to the domestic provisions
applicable when the treaty is applied (ambulatory interpretation). The latter should be preferred, however, a
different result may occur in individual cases where an amendment to the provisions of domestic law would
have made the DTC partially inoperative or the context otherwise would require a static interpretation. See
Paras. 11–12 of the Commentaries on Article 3; Traditionally, many commentators have been cautious about
9The means of interpretation have not been comprehensively codified into DTCs. Rather,
principles of international law provide further rules on interpretation. The most prominent
customary norms of international law have been codified into the 1969 Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), which entered into force in January 1980. The VCLT applies
to international agreements, including DTCs.27 Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT provide
general rules on the interpretation of international agreements, such as OECD Model-based
DTCs.
Regarding the means of interpretation, the ordinary meaning of a treaty term and the wording
in the context of the entire agreement is overriding.28 The object and purpose of the
agreement may be used as a subordinate source of interpretation. However, it should not be
applied as an independent means of interpretation. It is essential to note that the intention of
the contracting parties is only relevant to the extent that such intent has been expressed in
the treaty text, i.e. the intent must be supported by the wording of the treaty in order to have
an interpretative effect. Each language version is equally binding if not agreed otherwise.
This means that the majority of DTCs must be interpreted in the light of two or more
language versions.29
In conclusion, a primary order of reference for interpreting DTCs terms is adopted in this
study. The order is the following: special definitions provided in the treaty, the domestic
meaning of the term in the state concerned, meaning in accordance with the context, and
general rules of interpretation.30
1.5.4 Relevance of the OECD Commentary
In practice, the Commentaries are the most important source for interpretation with regard
to DTCs, after the wording of the treaty text. Tax administrations and courts worldwide
interpretation in accordance with domestic law and have preferred common interpretation arising from the
DTC’s context. Such systematic preference for interpretation from the context should not be adopted. To the
extent terms are not defined in the DTC, the clear wording of Article 3(2) requires that the domestic law
meaning is given precedence “unless the context requires otherwise”. See Reimer – Rust 2015, pp. 211–212.
27 Among 113 other states, Finland has ratified the VCLT in 1969. The VCLT is commonly recognized and
used as guidance for interpretation also in states which have not ratified the treaty.
28 Pursuant to 31(2) of the VCLT, the context of the agreement includes the preamble, annexes and any other
agreement or instrument (for example, notes and letters) made in connection with the agreement. However,
”accompanying materials” created during negotiations only serve as supplementary means of interpretation.
29 Reimer – Rust 2015, pp. 37–41.
30 Ibid., p. 213.
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routinely consult the Commentaries when interpreting tax treaties.31 However, in light of the
rules of interpretation of treaties set forth in the VCLT, the Commentaries do not qualify as
“preparatory work”, which could be used as supplementary means of interpretation in the
meaning of Article 32. Regardless, because of their general conspicuousness and easy
obtainability, it is commonly accepted that the Commentaries are consulted in the
interpretation of DTCs.32
It is worth noting that the Commentaries do not represent legally binding interpretations of
the terms of a DTC and that the wording of the Commentaries cannot overrule an
unambiguous interpretation of the DTC’s text. What can be concluded, however, is that the
relative value of the Commentaries varies case to case. Their interpretative weight in each
particular situation depends on whether the mutual intention of the contracting states was to
copy the substance of the OECD Model in the relevant terms of their bilateral treaty or to
adopt a divergent form.33
1.6 Terminology
The term commissionaire is a concept derived from the French language without clear
counterpart in the English language. The concept does not fully correspond with the term
commission agent, therefore, the French-inspired concept is used in this study.34 The English
language term commissionaire is  used  as  a  synonym  for  the  original  French  term,
commissionnaire. The former spelling, which is more commonly used in English and
American legal literature, is preferred over the French spelling. The latter spelling more
commonly appears in the publications of the OECD and the texts of French-speaking
commentators.
The terms commissionaire arrangement, commissionaire structure, and commissionaire
distributor model all refer to the same operating model structure, as defined in Chapter 2.1.
The term commissionaire distributor refers to the entity acting as a commissionaire for the
principal.
31 For example, see KHO 2013:169.
32 See Reimer – Rust 2015, p. 46; See Nieminen 2013a and 2013b for a comprehensive review of the
Commentaries’ relevance.
33 See Nieminen 2015a and 2015b.
34 Finnish commentators have also regularly used a French-inspired term, komissionääri.
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Because the commissionaire distributor model involves two or more jurisdictions, a clear
distinction between the jurisdictions must be drawn for the purposes of this study. The
jurisdiction wherein the commissionaire entity operates, i.e. distributes goods to local
customers, is referred to as the customer jurisdiction. In some other contexts, the same
jurisdiction may be referred to as the source state or the PE state.
1.7 Outline of the study
The study begins with an overview of the commissionaire distributor model. Chapter 2
discusses its legal and contractual structure. The commissionaire distributor model is
analyzed in the context of underlying civil law and common law legal doctrines. Applicable
contract law provisions are also identified in Chapter 2. Furthermore, the tax consequences
and other implications of the operating model are discussed.
Chapter 3 deals with the interpretation of the current international and domestic tax law
provisions of direct taxation which are applicable to commissionaire distributors. Relevant
case law and the most prominent interpretations by commentators are also analyzed to
provide a comprehensive systematization of the current and future tax position of a
commissionaire distributor. Furthermore, with regard to domestic legislative solutions, a
comparison is drawn to Swedish legislative counterparts.
Chapter 4 is concerned with the implementation of the new PE provisions affecting
commissionaire distributor models. The MLI and its implications are analyzed in this
context. The compatibility of current domestic law provisions with respective tax treaty
provisions is viewed in light of the forthcoming changes to tax treaty law. An updated
definition of PE and other related amendments to Finnish domestic legislation are also
proposed.
Finally, in Chapter 5, conclusions are drawn on the implication of the forthcoming changes
to DTCs. In addition, possible reactions to such changes are studied and operating model
alternatives for MNEs are introduced. Finally, the prospects and the remaining concerns
regarding the commissionaire distributor model are discussed.
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2 Commissionaire Distributor Model
MNEs in the business of selling tangible goods have multiple ways of carrying on business
abroad. They may choose to set up a full-fledged distributing entity in a customer
jurisdiction, a limited-risk distributing entity (LRD), set up a commissionaire, sell goods via
a local agent or resort to the services of a local marketing services company (MSC). In
essence, the difference between these distribution models is down to the functions
performed, risks assumed and assets used by the distributor in the customer jurisdiction.35
The more functions performed, risks assumed and assets employed, the more profit is
attributable to the distributing entity in the customer jurisdiction.
In the business of selling tangible goods, the overall profit can be divided into three
components. Firstly, there is profit attributable to the product itself which is down to the
markup, i.e. the difference between the cost of goods sold and the selling price. Secondly,
there is profit attributable to marketing and sales activities. Thirdly, the value can typically
also be attributed to intangibles, such as trade names or trademarks.36 These profit
components do not necessarily need to be taxed in the customer jurisdiction. Therefore,
several tax planning strategies can be applied.
A traditional fully-fledged distributor performs all of the central value chain activities of a
company.37 It takes care of its own operations, product logistics, marketing and sales
activities, after-sales support and servicing. Also, all key support functions are performed
and risks are borne by the fully-fledged distributor itself. In addition to distribution, a full-
fledged distributor may also be engaged in a wide variety of other business activities, such
as buying products directly from unrelated manufacturers and reselling them in its
jurisdiction.38
A LRD operates similarly to the fully-fledged alternative, in regard to taking title to the
products.39 This title may be a flash title, meaning that the distributor has ownership to the
35 See Storck – Petruzzi 2016, p. 88.
36 Buss et al. 2006, p. 13.
37 Porter’s concept of value chain divides a company’s activities into nine distinct business activities. See Porter
2008, Chapter ”How Information Gives You Competitive Advantage”, ”Strategic Significance”.
38 Buss et al. 2006, p. 14.
39 In this study, the terms limited-risk distributor and low-risk distributor are considered to coincide. The
OECD has preferred the latter term in its publications, on the other hand, commentators generally prefer the
former. Both terms refer to a distributor with less risk associated to the business than a fully-fledged distributor.
Occasionally, the term stripped buy–sell distributor is used to refer to the same type of entity.
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product for a very limited period of time. This arrangement might be accompanied with a
drop shipment contract, where the products are directly shipped from another company
within the same group to the customer of the LRD. Therefore, activities such as logistics and
warehousing are stripped from the distributing entity. Also, the LRD may only be required
to pay for its purchases after it has collected its own receivables from customers. With regard
to pricing, the intra-group prices of goods may be flexibly set, guaranteeing a gross margin
return to the LRD. These arrangements differentiate a LRD from fully-fledged distributors.
Even though it takes title to the product, the risks it bears are significantly reduced.40
A commissionaire distributor is best described as a hybrid between a traditional distributor
and an agent.41 It is a legal structure well-known and recognized in civil law jurisdictions,
with no clear counterpart in the common law legal system. A commissionaire distributor
sells products in the customer jurisdiction and act in its own name, but for the account of a
principal. The activities of a commissionaire are similar to those of a LRD. However, a
commissionaire does not take title to the products. Therefore, the risks borne are even more
limited. If structured correctly, the only profit component attributable to the commissionaire
is profit for marketing and sales activities, which is typically the smallest profit of the
components. The rather complex legal structure of a commissionaire is analyzed
comprehensively in Chapter 2.1.
Distribution in the customer jurisdiction can be arranged via an agent, acting in the name
and account of a principal. In such a structure, practically all of the risks are borne and most
value creating activities are carried out by the principal. Unlike the abovementioned
distribution alternatives, a traditional agency arrangement will generally constitute a PE for
the principal.
Finally, as a fifth alternative, a marketing services company set up in the customer
jurisdiction may provide a utilitarian solution in some industries. MSCs are not directly
engaged in the distribution of tangible products. Instead, they provide local sales support
and marketing services for the foreign principal. An MSC will only discuss contracts with
customers and advise them to conclude contracts directly with the principal. Contracts are
then concluded by the principal and the customer, typically via on-line form or other means
40 See Buss et al. 2006, p. 14. The LRD will typically not bear inventory risk or foreign exchange risk. The
product liability risk is also very limited.
41 Darby 2006, p. 2.
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of electronic communication. An MSC’s risk profile is very similar to that of the
commissionaire. Furthermore, if structured correctly, no PE is constituted for the principal
and the only profit component attributable to the MSC is profit for its marketing and sales
activities.42
2.1 Legal and contractual structure of the commissionaire distributor model
A commissionaire engaged in the business of distributing tangible goods is typically
structured flowingly (Diagram 1):
1) The principal company, also called the SalesCo, is typically a legal entity established
in a low-tax jurisdiction, selling products to high-tax jurisdictions. The principal is
in the business of manufacturing and distributing the products of the MNE.
To be able to benefit from treaty protection, the country of choice should have a
strong DTC network. Furthermore, in choosing the optimal state, the repatriation of
the profits from the commissionaire to the SalesCo and from the SalesCo to a
possible corporate parent must be considered, as well as favorable exit-tax
regulations. Practicalities relating to employees should also be acknowledged. The
most prominent court cases show that Ireland and Netherlands have been popular
jurisdictions for establishing SalesCos.43 However, traditional alternatives might not
be optimal much longer. Local peculiarities and implementation of the MLI ought to
have a significant effect on the choice of jurisdiction.
2) The commissionaire is either a direct subsidiary or a company belonging to the same
multinational group as the SalesCo. The commissionaire is established as a separate
legal entity, typically a limited company, in the customer jurisdiction.
3) The commissionaire acts as a sales agent in the customer jurisdiction and enters into
sales contracts with customers. However, the commissionaire acts as if it would be a
local company of the MNE and operates in its own name, not disclosing that
economically it acts for the account of a principal. Therefore, invoicing is done by
and in the name of the commissionaire.
4) After entering into a sales contract with a customer, the commissionaire then enters
into a back-to-back contract with the SalesCo. The contract terms stipulate that the
42 See Eisenbeiss 2016, p. 486.
43 See Dell and Boston Scientific; See Buss et al. 2006 p. 16 on the choice of jurisdiction.
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legal title to the product is passed directly from the principal to the commissionaire’s
customer. The product is then delivered directly to the customer via an international
carrier service or delivered by the commissionaire.44
5) The commissionaire is remunerated on a commission basis for its sales activities.
Because the functions performed, risks assumed and assets employed by the
commissionaire are very limited, the arms-length remuneration is also rather low. If
structured correctly, the only profit component attributable to the commissionaire is
profit for sales activities. The commission may be calculated, for example, as a
percentage of the total sales price or on a cost-plus basis.45
Diagram 1
The most significant feature of the commissionaire distributor model is that products are
sold to the customer without any contractual relationship or legal enforceability between the
company engaged in the sale of products, the SalesCo, and the customer. This notion relies
44 Regardless of the transfer of title, the tangible product itself may in some cases be passed on by the
commissionaire. In order to avoid constitution of a PE for the principal, the commissionaire should refrain
from maintaining stock in its own premises. In case a stock of goods owned by the principal is maintained, the
arrangement is likely to constitute a “fixed place of business”, i.e. a general PE in the meaning of Article 5(1)
of the OECD Model. In such case, the PE would result from the principal having “space at its disposal” at the
commissionaire’s premises. Even though not in the scope of this study, it is worth mentioning that in case a
MNE is willing to maintain a stock of goods in the customer jurisdiction, it is common practice to establish
separate premises, wherein the good are stored. Under the current OECD Model, such structure can benefit
from the preparatory and auxiliary activities exception, i.e. the negative list of Article 5(3). See Para. 4 on the
Commentary on Article 5.
45 See Darby 2006 pp. 2–3 and Buss et al. 2006 p. 14.
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on the concept of indirect representation found in civil law jurisdiction.46 The Finnish
system, which is fundamentally in line with other civil law jurisdictions, serves as a good
example. It is therefore studied hereunder.
In order to attain the desired result with regard to taxation, the legal structure of the
commissionaire arrangement is of high relevance. The principle of falsa demonstratio non
nocet entails that headlining the agreement between the principal and the commissionaire as
a commissionaire agreement is not in itself sufficient. In terms of content and characteristics,
the terms of the agreement shall be equivalent to a true commissionaire relationship. In
essence, the sales income must be received by the principal and the commissionaire shall be
remunerated on a commission basis. The commissionaire must also have full right to return
the principal’s goods without limiting contractual terms and the principal must bear the risks
related to distribution. Furthermore, the commissionaire shall not have right to dispose of
the principal’s property other than to enter into sales contracts with customers. Also, in a
true commissionaire arrangement, the property sold must not be recorded as assets in the
accounts of the commissionaire. In case a genuine commissionaire arrangement does not
exist, there is a risk of the arrangement being considered an agreement for an infinite number
of credit sales or sales as an agent.47
2.1.1 The concept of agency in Finnish contract law
Two types of representation—direct and indirect—are identified in Finnish contract law. In
direct representation, a third party doing transactions with the agent is aware of the principal
and aware that the agent’s transactions bind the principal, which will be bound to the
agreement. It is common that the agent openly informs third parties on the representation
when acting on behalf of the principal, or representation is otherwise apparent.
Indirect representation refers to an arrangement where the agent acts in its own name on
behalf of another person. In a strict legal sense, indirect representation is not considered
representation at all in the Finnish legal tradition. The acts of the indirect representative do
46 See Eisenbeiss 2016, pp. 484–485.
47 See NJA 2012 s. 419 regarding a commissionaire’s bankruptcy. The Supreme Court of Sweden examined,
inter alia, whether a real commission undertaking existed; See Tepora 1991 pp. 646–647 on the characteristics
of commissionaire agreements.
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not legally bind the principal. Commissionaires may be described as indirect representatives
under Finnish contract law.48
Dispositive representation is arranged via authorization.49 Hemmo and Hoppu (2006) define
authorization as a power of representation founded by legal act, wherein the principal grants
the agent the power to represent and act on behalf of the principal with direct legal effect.50
Pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 2 of the Finnish Contracts Act (228/1929), the
principal will become bound by way of the transactions entered into by the agent within the
scope of his/her authority and in the name of the principal. Respectively, the agent is not
bound to the transactions entered into by the way of direct representation.
In the case of indirect representation, where an agent acts in its own name on behalf of
another person, two separate contracts are formed. One, entered into between the principal
and the agent (1. Contract), for example a commissionaire, and another between the agent
and the other party (2. Contract), for example a final customer (Diagram 2). No legally
binding contract is formed between the end customer and the principal.51
Diagram 2
2.1.2 The concept of agency in common law jurisdictions
Like in the civil law system, agency is arranged via authorization also in common law
jurisdictions, wherein the agent is authorized by a principal to act on its behalf. However,
unlike in civil law jurisdictions, common law legal systems do not make distinction between
direct and indirect representation or different types of agents. To this end, common law only
distinguishes disclosed and undisclosed agents.52
48 Hemmo – Hoppu 2006, Chapter 5. ”Edustus”, ”Edustuksen lajeja”, ”Välitön ja välillinen edustus”.
49 In some situations, representation is statuary or even inevitable. Corporate bodies shall be represented by
natural persons. For example, limited companies are represented by their board members (Companies Act,
624/2006).
50 Hemmo – Hoppu 2006, Chapter 5. “Edustus”, ”Tahdonvaltainen edustus”, Valtuutus.
51 See Chapter 2.3 on the collateral security functions of a commissionaire arrangement.
52 Parada 2013, pp. 59–61; Avery Jones – Ward 1993, p. 158.
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When a third person enters into a contract with the agent and is aware that the agent acts in
the name of the principal, that situation is a disclosed agency. If the third party does not have
that knowledge and the agency, as well as the principal, remain undisclosed, that situation
is an undisclosed agency. However, regardless of the fact that the principal remains
undisclosed to the third party, the undisclosed agent doctrine provides that all contracts made
by an agent are legally binding on the principal. Both disclosed and undisclosed principals
are bound to the contracts entered into by the agent if the agent has acted within its
authority.53
In the case of non-performance, the contracts entered into by an undisclosed or disclosed
common law agent are enforceable against the principal. Some differences do exist among
common law jurisdictions on whether the third party must decide to take action against the
agent or the principal, or whether a third party can subsequently take action against the
undisclosed principal if it holds a judgment against the agent.54
Clearly, the civil law commissionaire does not have a common law counterpart. Undisclosed
agents and commissionaires shall, therefore, not be confused. These concepts are far from
equal. In common law agency, only one contract can be identified, i.e. a contract made
between the principal, acting via the agent, and the third party. Therefore, in civil law
terminology, all agency contracts entered into by common law agents shall have a similar
effect as direct representation.55
Regardless of the above mentioned, some workarounds are available for the purposes of
avoiding PE status in common law jurisdictions as well. The agreements entered into
between the commissionaire and the customer can be supplemented with a specific provision
providing that the sales contract is entered into exclusively between the parties and does not
bind any other party, such as the principal. Such arrangements are referred to as synthetic
commissionaires. Therefore, with some caution, it can be concluded that the freedom of
contract enables parties to exploit commissionaire distributor arrangements also in
jurisdictions where indirect representation is not recognized.56
53 Parada 2013, pp. 59–61; Avery Jones – Ward 1993, p. 158.
54 Ibid.
55 See Avery Jones – Ward 1993, p. 158.
56 See OECD 2012, p. 34; Eisenbeiss 2016, p. 486; Baker 2014, p. 28; See Avery Jones – Ward 1993, p.158
on cases under common law in which the principal is not bound; To the author’s knowledge, a synthetic
commissionaire structure has not yet been tested in a supreme court of a common law country.
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2.1.3 Domestic law provisions on commissionaires
Unlike most Nordic countries, Finnish legislation does not include a specific act on
commissionaires. The Finnish Act on Commercial Representatives and Salesmen
(417/1992) does not apply to commissionaires, only to traditional agents. Certain general
provisions on agents are included in Chapter 18 of the Finnish Commercial Code (3/1734),
regarding inter alia, the agent’s liabilities towards the principal. However, general principles
of contract law, as described above, determine the legal and contractual relationship between
the principal and the agent.
Some Nordic countries have commissionaire-specific acts and the civil codes of Central
European countries include commissionaire provisions. These acts and provisions lay down
the principals of commissionaire arrangements and set forth the general principle that
contracts entered into by commissionaire are in the name of the commissionaire, not the
principal. Therefore, the commissionaire’s contracts do not generally bind the principal.57
For example, Section 1 of the Swedish Commissionaire Act provides that the law applies to
acting on behalf of another person but in the name of the commissionaire to sell or buy
movable property.
In conclusion, regardless of different legislative measures, the contracts entered into by civil
law commissionaires are in the name of the commissionaire, not in the name of the principal.
As a premise, the commissionaire’s agreements do not bind the principal in civil law
jurisdictions.
2.2 Tax consequences
The success of the commissionaire distributor model relies on two key factors. Firstly, the
most crucial factor is the ability the ability to avoid PE status in the customer jurisdiction.
Secondly, favorable TP and profit attribution enables profit shifting to the principal’s state.
The focus of this study is on the commissionaire’s ability to avoid PE status, however, a
brief introduction to the relevant TP rules is necessary in this context.
57 See Swedish Commissionaire Act (Kommissionslag 2009:865), Norwegian Commissionaire Act (Lov om
kommisjon; 1916-06-30-1), French Civil Code (Code de commerce; 2013-504) Section L. 132-1, German
(Handelsgesetzbuch or HGB) Section 383 and Spanish Código de Comercio (Commercial Code) Article 246.
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In a related-party commissionaire distributor arrangement, the commissionaire provides
services to its principal, i.e. a company belonging to the same group, engaged in the business
of selling the products of the MNE. Because no PE is constituted for the principal, questions
regarding profit allocation in terms of Article 7 of the OECD Model do not arise. However,
Section 31 of the VML requires that the principal remunerates the commissionaire for its
services on an arms-length basis.
Pursuant to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax
Administrations (OECD TP Guidelines), compensation paid between related-party
enterprises must reflect the functions that each enterprise performs, taking into account
assets used and risks assumed.58 From a tax planning perspective, in case the principal is
located in a low-tax jurisdiction which provides for more beneficial tax treatment than the
customer jurisdiction, it is in the taxpayer’s interest to limit the functions performed, assets
used and risks assumed by the commissionaire to a bare minimum. The more limited, the
less tax exposure the commissionaire will face in the customer jurisdiction.
The commissionaire’s remuneration is commonly determined on a cost-plus basis or
determined as a percentage of sales.59 Appropriate arm’s length remuneration to the
commissionaire distributor may vary across different markets even for transactions
involving the same services. Therefore, conducting a study which takes into consideration
the different commission rates used between unrelated principals and distribution agents is
advisable. A typical commission would amount to 5–15% of the sales income concerned.60
However, in certain situations, commissions as low as 1% of the total turnover have not been
scrutinized.61 In conclusion, the commission can be set at a relatively low level. However, it
cannot be non-existent and should always be set at an arms-length level to avoid income tax
adjustment on the basis of Section 31 of the VML.
In typical commissionaire distributor arrangements, the commission will be the only profit
attributable to the group entity in the customer jurisdiction. Sales profits will not incur in
hands of the commissionaire because the title to the products passes directly from the
58 OECD 2010, Chapter 1; Tax authorities and courts regularly use the OECD TP Guidelines as a source of
reference in matters that require interpretation.
59 The remuneration is determined by taking into account the costs incurred by the commissionaire and adding
a markup to this cost to make an appropriate profit in light of the functions performed. See OECD 2010 p. 26
on the definition of the cost-plus method.
60 Darby 2006, p. 15–16.
61 See Leegaard 2012 p. 318 on the Dell case.
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principal to the customer. Where the commissionaire structure is accompanied with the
migration of intellectual property to a holding company, the tax exposure will remain very
limited.
Regardless of the nuances relating to remuneration, the success of the commissionaire
arrangement boils down to the principal’s ability to distribute goods in the customer
jurisdiction without constituting a PE. Due to the current interpretation of agency PE
provisions, the activities of the commissionaire will generally not exceed the current PE
threshold set forth in OECD Model-based DTCs.62
Altogether, the commissionaire distributor model lets MNEs have local representation in
customer jurisdictions without respective taxable presence. The commissionaire distributor
model enables minimization of taxable profits in customer jurisdictions by shifting taxable
income to the entity acting as the principal. In certain circumstances, such arrangement is
beneficial and works together with other tax planning arrangements to reduce the overall
effective tax rate of the MNE. However, the taxation of a MNE must be optimized on a
group level. Therefore, a commissionaire distributor model is not always the optimal
solution. PE constitution may be beneficial in some circumstances.63
In certain jurisdictions, commissionaire structures may bring other tax benefits as well. As
an excursion, a brief introduction to the relationship between commissionaire distributor
arrangements and anti-deferral regimes, such as CFC provisions, is appropriate in this
context. One interesting feature of the commissionaire structure, which has been a significant
factor in the structure’s popularity, is that the commissionaire distributor model has enabled
US-based MNEs to circumvent local CFC rules—the subpart F provisions. When the
SalesCo, i.e. the group entity controlling the distribution of goods, purchases goods from an
unrelated party and sells them to a local full-fledged distributor, subpart F rules are triggered.
The sales income from a foreign base company is subject to income taxation in the US.
However, where a commissionaire distributor model is implemented, the SalesCo will not
engage in a related-party sale, because the transfer of title is directly transferred to the
customer without a related party taking title. Therefore, without material change in actual
62 On this conclusion, see Chapter 3.1.5.
63 See Chapter 3.4.
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distribution models or change in operations, MNEs have been able to achieve significant
advantages. Therefore, many US-based MNEs have opted for commissionaire structures.64
2.3 Other implications
Even though the implementation of a commissionaire distribution model may primarily or
solely tax-motivated, the structure will have implications to the MNE that are way broader
than tax. Many aspects of business will be affected by the changes in contractual
relationships between the principal and the local distributor.
Regardless of the avoidance of PE status, the entity acting as a commissionaire will have to
meet the local compliance requirements in the customer jurisdiction, wherein the entity is
established and operative. However, the avoidance of PE status limits the principal’s
administrative burden. Firstly, PE status would require filing a start-up notification and
trigger the requirement to file a Finnish income tax return.65 Secondly, depending on the
specific circumstances, a MNE operating via a PE would be required, inter alia, to seek for
entry in the Register of Employers, pay social security payments, file periodic tax returns
and employer payroll reports. Thirdly, PE status triggers the requirement to make and
maintain an accounting of the business transactions of the PE. In principle, these accounting
materials should be kept in a place located in Finland.66 With regard to VAT, the requirement
to register is connected to somewhat similar requirements, PE constitution for the purposes
of VAT.67 These requirements cannot be further discussed in this context. However, what
can be concluded in general, is that avoiding PE status will prevent the MNE from fulfilling
similar burdensome compliance requirements twice in one jurisdiction.
In comparison to a full-fledged distributor, a commissionaire distributor arrangement has a
risk-shifting effect on the MNE as well. When the commissionaire does not take title to the
distributed products and due to other contractual arrangements, product liability risk, bad
debt risk, foreign exchange risk and inventory risk are all centralized to the principal entity.
64 See Swanick et al. 1997, p. 137; See US Internal Revenue Code, §§ 951–965; A commissionaire distributor
model may allow circumvention of CFC rules in jurisdictions where related-party sales trigger application.
65 In case the principal would be located in a country outside the European Economic Area, also a permit from
the Finnish Patent and Registration Office for the establishment of the branch would be required.
66 See Finnish Accounting Act (1336/1997). See also Finnish Auditing Act (1142/2015) on situations where a
statutory audit of a Finnish PE must be arranged.
67 Provisions on PE for purposes of VAT differ from those applied in income taxation. See Section 11 of the
Finnish VAT Act (1501/1993).
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Furthermore, the principal’s risk position is affected by the circumstance that sales contracts
are entered into in the name of the commissionaire, not the principal. Where the contracts
do not bind the principal, most contractual responsibilities are not enforceable against the
principal either. In the case of bankruptcy of the commissionaire, the principal is not obliged
to execute the contracts, i.e. deliver products to the customer. In fact, the principal would
have the right of separation to the products it holds title to.68 Therefore, the commissionaire
arrangement also works as an effective and simple collateral security arrangement.69
In respect to management of the distribution business, centralization may provide certain
advantages. As an operating model alternative, the commissionaire distributor model renders
possible the centralization of the MNE’s buy–sell operations. This may help optimize stock
management and enhance control over the entire value chain. Even better, centralization can
be carried out without changing the appearance of the local business structure. Customers
will continue to believe that they are entering into transactions with a local distributor.
Consolidation of profits to the SalesCo can also provide advantages where operations in
customer jurisdictions are unprofitable. Entering into new weaker markets is likely to result
in start-up losses, which may not be offset anywhere else. In a commissionaire structure, the
losses in the customer jurisdiction are minimized, because operations are very limited.
Consolidation will enable subsidizing the weak markets with the revenue flows from
profitable markets.
Controlling the administrative burden, collateral security characteristics and centralization
of business functions together with the agile structure of a commissionaire distributor allows
for cost reduction in the customer jurisdiction. In consequence, a MNE may opt to distribute
its products also to smaller jurisdictions, without extensive revenue potential, via a
commissionaire distributor arrangement.
The cost reduction advantages and efficiencies accomplished by the distribution model may,
however, be offset by the additional costs incurred because of local tax authorities
challenging the somewhat artificial or abusive arrangement. A particularly high risk of
scrutiny from the local authorities is present in the process of establishing the
68 See Tepora 1991, p. 631; Such right would become relevant in case the distributable goods would already
be under the commissionaire’s control and the commissionaire would face insolvency. Pursuant to Chapter 5
Section 6 of the Finnish Bankruptcy Act (120/2004), the assets have to be detached from the debtor’s assets,
in order to exercise the right of separation.
69 Ibid., p. 655.
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commissionaire distributor model. Issues may arise in connection with business
restructurings or conversions, where traditional full-fledged distributors are converted into
commissionaires. Restructurings typically include the sale of fixed assets, stock and
customer base to the principal.70 For example, restructurings may constitute taxable the sale
of goodwill or other intangibles. Moreover, when new entities are established to replace full-
fledged distributors, compensation payment for breach of existing contracts may be required
and limitations to the transfer of existing losses may apply.71
Distribution models have implications broader than tax, some of what have been discussed
here. In addition to tax treatment, many practical issues have to be considered. For instance,
customs procedures and other aspects in connection with importation must be taken into
account.
70 OECD 2014b, p. 11.
71 See Buss et al. 2006, pp. 14–16; Swanick et al. 1997, pp. 138–143.
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3 The Concept of Agency Permanent Establishment
3.1 OECD Model
In its current form, Article 5 of the OECD Model consists of seven paragraphs, which define
the concept of PE. Paragraph 1 gives a general definition of the concept, brings forward its
characteristics. It is referred to as the general PE rule. Paragraph 2—the positive list—
further clarifies the concept and gives examples, which prima facie constitute a PE.
Paragraph 3 provides a 12-month threshold for building sites, construction and installation
projects. Therefore, Article 5(3) is referred to as the construction PE.72 The Paragraph
clarifies some of the uncertainties relating to such projects and limits the scope of application
of the PE concept.
A number of business activities are listed in Article 5(4), which are treated as exceptions to
the general definition of PE laid down in Article 5(1). The exceptions listed in the non-
exhaustive negative list are considered, as such, preparatory or auxiliary activities.
Therefore, the listed activities will not amount to a taxable presence in the said state.
Furthermore, Article 5(4)(e) serves as a general restriction to the scope of the general PE
rule. It excludes any activity of a preparatory or auxiliary character from the scope, even
activities which have not been explicitly mentioned in the negative list. Pursuant to Article
5(4)(f), combinations of activities are also exempt, provided that the overall activity is of a
preparatory or auxiliary character.73
It is commonly accepted that in addition to substantial physical presence in the state
concerned, a PE should also be constituted where business by a non-resident is carried on
via a dependent agent. In this manner, the Paragraph 5 of the OECD Model sets forth an
alternative test to whether a company has a PE in a state. Even though the foreign company
72 In this respect, the UN Model differs from the OECD Model. Firstly, instead of a 12-month test, the UN
Model includes a six-month test for a construction PE. Secondly, Article 5(3)(a) of the UN Model is broader
than article 5(3) of the OECD Model, also including assembly projects and supervisory activities carried out
in connection with a building site, a construction, assembly or installation project.
73 See Paras. 24 and 27 of the Commentaries on Article 5 on the preparatory or auxiliary character of activities
and interpretation thereof; Article 5(4) of the UN Model differs from that of the OECD Model. The word
“delivery” has been deleted from Articles 5(4)(a) and (b) of the UN Model, therefore, it does not apply to the
delivery of goods or merchandise belonging to the enterprise. With regard to commissionaire distributor
arrangements, mostly subparagraphs a) and b) of the OECD Model are relevant to the extent that the principal
company maintains inventory, separate of the commissionaire, for the purposes of acquiring, storing or
delivering its own goods or merchandise. The negative list, therefore, enables the parent to maintain inventory
in the state of the customer without taxable presence.
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may not have a fixed place of business in that state within the meaning of Article 5(1) and
5(2), the enterprise should be treated as having a PE in a state if there is a dependent agent
acting for it. Article 5(5) is also referred to as the agency PE. The threshold for the
constitution of an agency PE is further defined in Paragraph 6, which has been inserted in
the Article for the sake of clarity and emphasis.74
With regard to the concept of PE, Paragraph 7 sets forth the underlying principle that, for
the purpose of taxation, a subsidiary company constitutes an independent legal entity.
Paragraph 7 also further clarifies the concept of PE. However, it is to be noted that a parent
company may be found having a PE in a state where a subsidiary has a place of business,
under the general PE rule or under the agency PE rule.75
The OECD Model sets the foundation for the interpretation of agency PE provisions.
Because the current definitions set forth in EU law and Finnish domestic legislation are
fundamentally based on the OECD Model, the wording of the OECD Model is studied first.
With regard to commissionaire distributors, Articles 5(5) and 5(6) represent the most
material part of Article 5. However, the agency PE is only an alternative PE test included in
the OECD Model. In certain situations, a commissionaire may also fall within the scope of
the general PE rule as well.76 Furthermore, to a certain extent, the provisions in EU law and
Finnish national legislation adhere to the wording of Article 5(1) and 5(2). Therefore, also
the provisions of the general PE are studied to a relevant extent.
Article 5 in the OECD Model and in the UN Model are rather similar. Most differences with
respect to PEs boil down to the allocation of profits under Articles 7 and additional types of
PEs—the services PE77 and the insurance PE78. Deviations from the OECD Model are
highlighted where relevant.
74 Para. 36 of the Commentaries on Article 5.
75 The counterpart of Article 5(7) in the UN Model includes a second sentence addressing situations where an
agent acts wholly or almost wholly on behalf of an associated enterprise. Such discrepancy does not have
relevance to the PE status of commissionaires which do not rely on the independent agent exception. As Vann
2011 p. 8 notes, the ”relationship issue only enters once the agency test is satisfied”.
76 For example, see Dell Spain.
77 See Article 5(3)(b) of the UN Model; A similar services PE provision, which countries may include in their
bilateral DTCs, is provided in Para. 42.23 of the OECD Commentary on Article 5.
78 See Article 5(6) of the UN Model.
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3.1.1 Historical developments
The emergence of the PE concept dates back to 19th century German Empire, where the PE
concept was first included in tax statutes in 1885. The concept was first established in
international tax provisions in the 1899 Austria-Hungary–Prussia tax convention, wherein
the term “business establishment” was used for the first time. The same convention is
considered the first general international tax treaty. This treaty already included the
substantial elements of a PE, such as the “fixed place of business” requirement, also found
in the current OECD Model. From early on, taxing jurisdiction could also be justified on the
basis of permanent agency, even though the distinction between dependent and independent
agents was not yet established.79
The 1927 League of Nations Draft DTC also contained a PE provision, including the “fixed
place of business” requirement and the agency element, which now specifically excluded
independent agents.80 The Mexico Model of 1943, developed by the League of Nations
Fiscal Committee, added to the PE concept adopted in the 1927 League of Nations
convention by introducing the construction PE rule for building sites, the exclusion of
commercial travelers and subsidiaries, and several rules for agents, which are present in the
current OECD Model.81 Contrary to current Models, the 1943 Mexico Model did require
that the fixed place of business have a productive character.82
The League of Nation’s work in the development of DTCs was continued by the
Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) and its successor, the OECD.
Their work lead to the 1963 OECD Draft, which contained a definition of PE.83 The
underlying principles of PE developed by the League of Nations were not changed, but a
completely new draft text was set forth. This text included the current formulation of the
79 Skaar 1991, pp. 72–77.
80 League of Nations Draft Bilateral Convention for the Prevention of Double Taxation, 1927.
81 Mexico Draft Model Bilateral Convention for the Prevention of the Double Taxation of Income and Property,
1943.
82Arnold 2016, Chapter 1.2.1.3 “The Mexico Draft (1943)”; Skaar 1991, p. 88 notes that the international
taxing jurisdiction of business profits was radically changed by the Mexico Model. The Mexico Model
introduced a system of source state taxation, wherein the PE was just an example, not a decisive criterion for
the taxation of business profits. However, the source state system was then abandoned in the 1946 London
Draft Model Bilateral Convention for the Prevention of the Double Taxation of Income and Property.
83 OECD Draft Double Taxation Convention on Income and Capital, 1963.
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general PE rule, the list of positive examples, wherein the construction PE provision was
included, and a simplified agency clause.
The legal foundations for the current commissionaire model, as we know it, can also be dated
back to the OEEC drafting of the 1963 OECD Draft. Stock holding agents were then
removed from the scope of the agency PE provision. Prior to removal, a commissionaire
holding a stock for the enterprise would have constituted a PE. In consequence, the article
was left with the definition of “authority to negotiate contracts or to enter into contracts on
behalf of the enterprise”.84 However, the revised version of the Fiscal Committee’s draft
Report to the Council, dated 19 April 1958, contained changes which would, later on, have
far-reaching implications. It contained the definition present in the current Article 5(5), i.e.
“authority to conclude contracts in the name of the enterprise”.85
Different interpretations have been presented on why the expression “in the name of” was
adopted. No document explains the change from “on behalf of” to “in the name of”.86 Avery
Jones and Ward (1993) assume that this change in content was down to the unfortunate
adoption of the civil law concept of “in the name of” due to a faulty literal translation from
the French language version. They further claim that this expression should have been
translated differently.87 On the contrary, Pijl (2013b) justifies consistently that this change
in content was not considered relevant, because the drafters did not perceive any difference
between the terms “on behalf of” and “in the name of ”, both meaning binding.88
The treaty text adopted in the 1963 OECD Draft did not attempt to describe the
characteristics of a dependent agent. Pursuant to Skaar (1991), this was because the previous
attempts to describe and exemplify the concept had not been very successful. The OECD
rather chose to deal with the issue with a comprehensive Commentary. The OECD did,
however, attempt to reach a general dependent agent definition, emphasizing on the authority
to conclude contracts and habitual execution thereof.89
To reflect the change in opinions of OECD member countries and changes in international
business and national tax laws, the OECD Model of 1977 and respective Commentaries
84 Fiscal Committee’s original report, dated 17 September 1956.
85 See Pijl 2013a, p. 12; Pijl 2013b, pp. 70–71.
86 Pijl 2013b, p. 72.
87 Avery Jones – Ward 1993, pp. 156–166.
88 Pijl 2013b, p. 73.
89 Skaar 1991, pp. 96–97.
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where introduced. The construction PE rule was moved into a separate provision, Article
5(3). Furthermore, the general exception for preparatory or auxiliary activities, current
Article 5(4)(e), was moved into a separate provision. Finally, the specific exemption for
agents engaged exclusively in purchasing goods for an enterprise was removed.90
Since the 1977 OECD Model, the wording of Article 5 has not changed. However, the
concept of PE has evolved considerably through changes to the Commentary. In recent
years, the OECD has strived to clarify issues arising from the definition of PE by publishing
two discussion drafts dealing with questions relating to PEs.91 These discussion drafts,
published in 2011 and 2012, touched upon many highly relevant questions subject to
debate.92 However, the 2014 update to the OECD Model did not include any of the proposed
changes to the Commentary, since it was expected by the OECD that Action 7 would result
in changes to Article 5. It was decided that the proposed changes to the Commentary would
not be finalized until the work on Action 7 was completed.93 The reasons for not adopting
the changes proposed in 2011 and 2012 are likely to include the lack of common
understanding among the OECD member states on the matters at hand and the realization
that amendments to the Commentary would not be sufficient. Rather, the wording of the
OECD Model would have to be changed to achieve policy goals.94
Clearly, OECD and G20 policy-makers have been of the opinion that the Commentary
driven change has not been considerable enough, thus lagging behind the vast developments
in international business. After 36 years of stagnant development of the PE concept, the
OECD and G20 countries have adopted a 15-point Action Plan to address BEPS in
September 2013. Action 7 will result in significant changes to the wording of Article 5.
As Skaar (1993) concludes, the development of tax treaties since the late 19th century shows
a clear change in paradigm, a tremendous shift from source state taxation to residence state
taxation. Most amendments to DTCs since the 1927 League of Nations Draft DTC have, in
fact, resulted in the loss of tax revenues to the source state. In line with this shift, the PE
90 Arnold 2016, Chapter 1.2.2. “The OEEC/OECD to 1977”.
91 See OECD 2012 and OECD 2011.
92 See OECD 2012, especially issues 19. (Meaning of “to conclude contracts in the name of the enterprise”),
20. (Is paragraph 5 restricted to situations where sales are concluded?), 21. (Does paragraph 6 apply only to
agents who do not conclude contracts in the name of?), and 22. (Assumption of entrepreneurial risk as a factor
indicating independence).
93 OECD 2014.
94 Storck – Petruzzi 2016, p. 94.
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concept has been significantly narrowed down since the late 19th century. This tendency is
apparent especially regarding the concept of agency PE.95 As was concluded over 25 years
ago by Skaar, many consider that this shift across the board has accumulated and see a need
to revive source state taxation.96 No doubt, the proposals in Action 7 are a response to these
concerns.
3.1.2 General rule
The general PE rule in Article 5(1) provides that term PE means a “fixed place of business
through which the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly carried on”. Three distinct
cumulative conditions for PE constitution can be identified:
1) existence of a “place of business”
2) the place of business must be “fixed”
3) business of the enterprise shall be “carried on” through this fixed place of business
At first sight, the general definition of PE appears rather broad. However, the general PE
rule is subject to the exceptions in Articles 5(3), regarding construction activities, and Article
5(4), regarding preparatory and auxiliary activities. A general restriction on the scope of the
definition is provided in Article 5(4)(e), which excludes activities of preparatory and
auxiliary character from the scope.97
Place of business
The first requirement, the existence of a “place of business”, refers to any premises, facilities
or installations which also fulfill the other two requirements. The Commentary further
clarifies that a place of business may also exist where the enterprise simply has ”space at its
disposal”. This interpretation broadens the first requirement to cover also business activities
which are carried on without premises available or to activities which, in fact, do not require
premises for carrying on the business. Therefore, space at the enterprise’s disposal in the
business facilities of another enterprise may also constitute a “place of business” in the
meaning of Article 5. This is regardless of whether the enterprise has formal legal right to
95 Pijl 2013a, p.12.
96 Skaar 1991, p. 101.
97 Para. 21. of the Commentaries on Article 5.
31
use the space, such as a lease contract.98 However, the Commentary clarifies that mere
presence at a location is not sufficient to constitute a ”space at its disposal”.99
Fixed
The second requirement sets forth the rule that the place of business has to be “fixed”. This
means that there has to be a link between the “place of business” and a specific geographical
point. This requirement of a link does not entail that the place of business has to be fixed
into soil. Remaining on a particular site is sufficient.100
Being “fixed” also requires a certain degree of permanency. Depending on the specific DTC,
the required permanency may be subject to different interpretations. However, as of January
2003, the Commentary has mentioned as a rule of thumb that a six-month threshold has been
generally accepted in tax praxis. Temporary interruptions of activities do not cause a PE to
cease to exist.101
Through which the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly carried on
The third requirement for the application of the general PE rule is that the business of the
enterprise must be “carried on” through this “fixed place of business”. Pursuant to the
Commentary, business is carried on through a fixed place of business in any situation where
business activities are carried on at a particular location that is “at the disposal of” the
enterprise for that purpose. Therefore, the words “through which” must be given a wide
meaning.102
According to the Commentary, the “business of an enterprise is carried on” either by the
entrepreneur, the employees of the enterprise or a dependent agent. In certain situations, the
business of an enterprise can be “carried on” also via automatic equipment.103 The  word
98 See Paras. 4. and 4.1 of the Commentaries for examples of an enterprise having ”space at its disposal”.
Examples include a pitch in a marketplace, a permanently used area in a customs depot, another enterprise’s
premises at the disposal of a foreign enterprise and an illegally occupied location.
99 The difference between mere presence and having space at one’s disposal is illustrated in Paras. 4.2 (a
salesman who regularly visits a major customer), 4.3 (an employee at the premises of a newly acquired
subsidiary), 4.4 (a road transportation enterprise using a delivery dock), and 4.5 (a painter at the office of the
main client).
100 See Paras. 5.1. to 5.5 of the Commentaries for examples of “fixed” places of business, such as a mine, office
hotel, fair, painter in a large office building or a consultant engaged in training employees.
101 Paras. 6 and 6.1 of the Commentaries on Article 5.
102 Para. 4.6 of the Commentaries on Article 5.
103 See Arnold 2016, Chapter 5.5 “Digital economy PEs”.
32
“business” should also be interpreted in a broad manner. A productive character of the fixed
place of business is not required.104
As soon as the activities of the enterprise fulfill the three distinct requirements, i.e. carries
on its business through a fixed place of business, a PE begins to exist. The PE ceases to exist
if either the fixed place of business is disposed or any activity through it is discontinued.
Positive list
Pursuant to Article 5(2), the term PE includes especially:
a) a place of management;
b) a branch;
c) an office;
d) a factory;
e) a workshop, and
f) a mine, an oil or gas well, a quarry or any other place of extraction of natural
resources.
This list of activities further clarifies the general PE concept and gives examples which,
according to the Commentary, prima facie constitute a PE. It is noteworthy, that also the
examples listed are subject to the conditions set forth in Article 5(1). Therefore, the general
PE rule has primacy.105 The list is by no means exhaustive and has been subject to many
reservations and additions in actual DTCs.
3.1.3 Agency PE
In today’s world, MNEs may be engaged in significant business activities which do not
necessarily require fixed places of business in the traditional sense. MNEs may choose to
operate via an agent in the source jurisdiction. For reasons of neutrality and to limit the
possibility of artificially avoiding PE status, tax treaties include rules which lead to the
constitution of fictional PEs in certain situations.106
The agency PE rule is set forth in Article 5(5) of the OECD Model and reads as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2, where a person – other
than an agent of an independent status to whom paragraph 6 applies — is
104 Unproductive PEs will seldom have attributable profits. However, compliance requirements must be met
regardless of profitability.
105 Skaar 1991, p. 114.
106 Skaar 1991 p. 463 claims that:”[t]axation would infringe neutrality if the tax position of an enterprise’s
foreign business operations depended upon whether the enterprise conducted the business itself or through an
agent who was integrated to a large extent in the principal’s business”.
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acting on behalf of an enterprise and has, and habitually exercises, in a
Contracting State an authority to conclude contracts in the name of the
enterprise, that enterprise shall be deemed to have a permanent establishment
in that State in respect of any activities which that person undertakes for the
enterprise, unless the activities of such person are limited to those mentioned
in paragraph 4 which, if exercised through a fixed place of business, would
not make this fixed place of business a permanent establishment under the
provisions of that paragraph.
Three distinct, cumulative conditions for the constitution of an agency PE can be identified.
For the sake of clarity, the third requirement is broken down into three components:
1) existence of a dependent person (agent)
2) that person is acting on behalf of an enterprise (principal)
3) that person has, and
a. habitually exercises, an
b. authority to conclude contracts
c. in the name of the enterprise
Two restrictions to the application of Article 5(5) are also laid down in Article 5:
1) activities of a dependent agent which are limited to those mentioned in the negative
list (Article 5(4)), do not constitute an agency PE, and
2) the rule does not apply to an agent of an independent status to whom Article 5(6)
applies.
Person
Pursuant to the first condition, only a “person” may constitute a dependent agent in the
meaning of Article 5(5). Article 3(1) of the OECD Model defines the term “person”, which
includes an individual, a company and any other body of persons. The Commentary further
clarifies that such persons may either be individuals or companies, regardless of the person’s
state of residence or employment, as long as the person acts for the enterprise in accordance
with Article 5(5).107 Persons whose activities may create a PE for the principal are referred
to as dependent agents.
Acting on behalf
The second requirement is not clarified to a great extent in the Commentary, which only
states the general principle, according to which PE constitution is accepted by virtue of
activities “if there is under certain conditions a person acting for” the enterprise.108
107 See Para. 32 of the Commentaries on Article 5.
108 Para. 31 of the Commentaries on Article 5.
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Certainly, “acting” on behalf of another requires that some activity takes place and that the
principal’s and agent’s activities are somehow interrelated.109 Mere passive representation
shall not constitute sufficient “acting”.110 As the Commentary puts it, the authority to
conclude contracts must cover contracts relating to operations which constitute the “business
proper” of the enterprise, i.e. business belonging to the enterprise.111 French case law also
confirms this interpretation. In Interhome, the French Supreme Administrative Court held
relevant that the Swiss parent company’s and French subsidiary’s business activities were
legally different. The French subsidiary was not involved in the negotiation or conclusion of
holiday accommodation contracts with customers. Its activities were limited to signing rental
contracts and taking care of the proper execution of the rental contracts. The fact that the
subsidiary’s activities were different from those of the parent can be considered one relevant
factor, which lead to the conclusion that no agency PE was constituted for the Swiss parent
company in France.112
The term “on behalf of” is clearly not defined in the OECD Model. There is no explicit
definition included in the Commentary either. Therefore, to obtain the meaning of the term,
one must consult the national laws of the state concerned.113
As Storck and Schmidje (2014) point out, the words “acting on behalf of” are generally
translated in the German language as “eine Person, welche für ein Unternehmen tätig ist”,
which corresponds to the English version. However, the wording of the official French
version of the OECD Model is "une personne agit pour le compte d'une entreprise", which
can either be translated as “on behalf of” or “for the account of”.114 Respectively, in modern
Finnish tax treaties the words “acting on behalf of an enterprise” have been translated as
“harjoittaa yrityksen lukuun”.115 In the author’s view, the Finnish translations adopted in
DTCs, rather hold the meaning of “for the account of an enterprise” than “on behalf of an
enterprise”.
109 Storck – Schmidje 2014, p. 52.
110 Ibid., p. 51.
111 Para. 33 of the Commentaries on Article 5.
112 International Tax Law Reports 2003; However,  it  is  to be borne in mind that in Interhome, another key
factor was that the subsidiary did not have legal authority to bind its Swiss parent company. These factors
together lead to conclude that the subsidiary was of independent nature. See Storck – Schmidje 2014, p. 53.
113 See OECD Model Article 3(2).
114 Storck – Schmidje 2014, p. 54
115 Such translation has been adopted in all DTCs entered into by Finland during the past 10 years. For further
information on Finnish DTCs in force, see Verohallinto 2016.
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Further, to define the concept of “acting on behalf of” another, it must be resolved whether
acting on behalf of another in a formal manner is required, for example acting as an
authorized agent, or does the concept refer to acting in a more substantive, factual or
economic character.
The meaning of the official French version of the OECD Model indicates that a person acting
“for the account” of an enterprise is, in fact, acting for another in an economic sense.116
Similarly, the Finnish translation also refers to acting in a factual or economic sense. For
example, the Finnish term “lukuun” (“on behalf”) has been used in the last sentence of
Section 10(d) of the Act on the Tax Treatment of the Income of a Person Subject to
Unlimited Tax Liability (627/1978; LähdeVL) to refer to, whether shares are possessed “for
the account of” oneself or “for the account of” another. In this context the word “lukuun”
clearly refers to an activity of an economic nature rather than purely legal activity.
Furthermore, Article 28 of the VAT Directive (2006/112/EC) uses the phrase “on behalf of”
in the following context: “[P]erson acting in his own name but on behalf of another person
takes part in a supply of services”.117 The author’s interpretation is that in that context “on
behalf of” is used to refer to an activity of a factual nature. Therefore, at least in the
jurisdictions and languages discussed above, the concept “acting on behalf of an enterprise”
does not confine the application strictly to legal activities, i.e. does not require that one acts
legally on behalf of another.118
Habitually exercises
The Commentary clarifies that whether the agent habitually exercises his right or not, should
be determined on the basis of the commercial realities of the situation. The agent’s presence
should at least be more than merely transitory. Secondly, it is stated that the right is
sufficiently exercised “in a Contracting State”, even if the contract is signed elsewhere or
the signatory does not have a formal power of representation.119
Authority to conclude contracts
Whether the “authority” of the person is restricted in one way or the other, such restriction
is not material with regard to the application of the agency PE rule. It is highly unlikely that
116 Storck – Schmidje 2014, p. 52.
117 Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax.
118 Ibid., p. 54
119 Paras. 33 and 33.1 of the Commentaries on Article 5.
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an agent would be granted unlimited powers to bind the principal. Rather, it is common that
the agent’s authority is limited to specific activities, such as certain lines of business.120
As stated earlier, the “authority to conclude contracts” must cover contracts relating to
operations which constitute the “business proper” of the enterprise. However, this
requirement does not confine the existence of a permanent establishment only to the extent
that such a person exercises the authority to conclude contracts. Instead, the PE exists to the
extent that the person acts for the principal.121
In the name of the enterprise
Pursuant to the first sentence of Paragraph 32.1 of the Commentary:
Also, the phrase “authority to conclude contracts in the name of the
enterprise” does not confine the application of the paragraph to an agent who
enters into contracts literally in the name of the enterprise; the paragraph
applies equally to an agent who concludes contracts which are binding on the
enterprise even if those contracts are not actually in the name of the enterprise.
Paragraph 32.1 of the Commentary reflects the interpretation that the expression “in the
name of” should be interpreted as “binding”. Therefore, at least according to the
Commentary, acting literally in the name of the enterprise is not required.122
The aforementioned clarification in Paragraph 32.1, which in fact seems to be in
contradiction with the clear wording of Article 5(5), was inserted in the Commentary in
1994. However, Article 5(5) of the OECD Model was not amended. Rather, the phrase has
remained unchanged up to this date since 1963, when the first version of the OECD Model
was published. There has been debate and different interpretations on whether the
interpretation suggested in the Commentary holds true. The issue is further discussed in
Chapter 3.1.5. However, there is no doubt that simply an additional paragraph in the
Commentary by itself cannot justify interpretation in contradiction with the wording of the
OECD Model.123 Such effect would be contrary to the rules of interpretation established in
international tax law.124
120 The History on Commentaries on Article 5 goes on to explain that the term “general authority” was
commonly used in DTCs prior to the 1963 OECD Draft. However, such wording has been abandoned and
replaced simply by the term “authority”; See Daxkobler 2014, pp. 127–129.
121 Paras. 33 and 34 of the Commentaries on Article 5.
122 Para. 32.1 of the Commentaries on Article 5.
123 See Pijl 2013a, p. 13.
124 See Chapter 1.5 for the interpretation of international tax law provisions.
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Limitations to the scope
The agency PE rule is subject to two separate rules, which limit the scope of application.
Activities in the scope of the negative list set forth in Article 5(4) do not constitute a general
PE or an agency PE. In other words, the level of activities of an agent shall exceed those
mentioned in the negative list. Secondly, independent agents, to whom Article 5(6) applies,
will not constitute an agency PE. The interpretation of Article 5(6) is studied in the following
Chapter.
UN Model stock agent provision
Unlike the OECD Model, Article 5(5)(b) of the UN Model includes a stock agent provision,
which provides that a PE is deemed to exist also where a person:
habitually maintains in the first mentioned State a stock of goods or
merchandise from which he regularly delivers goods or merchandise on behalf
of the enterprise.
This provision effectively broadens the scope of the agency PE rule, as compared to the
OECD Model. Therefore, an agency PE will also be deemed to exist under the UN Model,
where an agent does not have the “authority to conclude contracts in the name of the
enterprise”, but acts as a stock agent for the principal.125 If however, the sales-related
activities of the stock agent only take place outside the agent’s state, a PE should not be
constituted.126 Some DTCs with developing countries also include similar additions, inter
alia, applying to agents engaged in habitually securing orders for the principal.127
3.1.4 Independent agent
As clarified in Article 5(5), the agency PE rule does not apply to an independent agent.
Article 5(6) of the OECD Model reads as follows:
An enterprise shall not be deemed to have a permanent establishment in a
Contracting State merely because it carries on business in that State through
a broker, general commission agent or any other agent of an independent
status, provided that such persons are acting in the ordinary course of their
business.128
125 For example, see Article 5(5)(b) of the Finland–Turkey DTC (49/2012), dated 6 October 2009.
126 See Para. 26 of the UN Model Article 5 Commentary.
127 For example, see Article 5(5)(c) of the Finland–India DTC (58/2010), dated 15 January 2010.
128 Article 5(6) of the UN Model includes a special provision on situations where insurance businesses
constitute PEs. Article 5(6) of the OECD Model corresponds to Article 5(7) of the UN Model.
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Therefore, an agency PE is not constituted where two cumulative conditions are met:
1) the agent is of an independent status, and
2) such agent is acting in the ordinary course of its own business
In addition to the two cumulative conditions, one cannot help but wonder why general
commission agents and brokers are specifically mentioned in Article 5(6). A civil law lawyer
might ask, what is the rationale for mentioning these two if commission agents and brokers
generally fall outside the scope of Article 5(5). There has been some debate on whether these
examples have been misplaced and are without meaning in civil law jurisdictions, or whether
such tension exists at all.129 In spite of this minor obscurity, commission agents and brokers
must fulfill both cumulative requirements in order to be independent agents in the meaning
of Article 5(6).
Agent of an independent status
In order to be considered an independent agent in the light of Article 5(6), the activities of
the agent must pass two separate tests, the tests of legal and economic dependence. With
regard to legal dependence, the Commentary notes that a corporate parent’s control over its
subsidiary in its capacity as a shareholder is not relevant in this consideration.130 This
interpretation conforms with Article 5(7) as well. The Article sets forth the general principle
that for the purpose of taxation, a subsidiary company constitutes an independent legal
entity. This, of course, does not entail that a subsidiary could not constitute a PE for the
parent.
To the end of economic independence, the extent of the obligations which the agent has vis-
à-vis the enterprise is decisive. If the agent’s commercial activities are subject to detailed
instructions or it is otherwise under comprehensive control by the principal, such person
cannot be regarded as independent of the enterprise. The agent cannot be considered
economically independent either, if the entrepreneurial risk of the agent’s activities is borne
by the principal.131
Acting in the ordinary course of their business
129 On the first point, see Avery Jones – Ward 1993 p. 178; On the second point, see Pijl 2013a pp. 9–10; See
Chapter 3.1.5 for further discussion on the relationship of Articles 5(5) and 5(6).
130 Para. 38.1 of the Commentaries on Article 5.
131 Para. 38 of the Commentaries on Article 5. See Paras. 38.3 to 38.6 for further considerations for determining
independence.
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A negative definition for the second requirement is that a person is not acting in the ordinary
course of their own business if the activities performed belong to the sphere of the principal’s
business.132 A comparison between the agent’s activities and the customary activities carried
out within the agent’s trade as a broker, commission agent or another independent agent,
may serve as an indication of dependence.133
Altogether, the interpretation of the independent agent exception makes it clear that the
commissionaire distributor will seldom fall within Article 5(6). However, falling within the
exception may be possible under certain circumstances. In a rather dated Finnish advance
ruling by the Central Tax Board (KVL) 68/1996, a Finnish subsidiary of a Dutch company
operated via a typical commissionaire arrangement. The subsidiary was engaged in sales
activities in its own name but on behalf of its principal. Firstly, based on the circumstances
that the commissionaire was not subject to detailed instructions and no acceptance was
needed from the principal for the conclusion of contracts, KVL found that the Finnish
commissionaire entity was independent. Moreover, the commissionaire did not have an
exclusive right to a specific market area, and the commissionaire bore the associated
business risks since the commissionaire’s performance directly affected its profitability.
Secondly, the commissionaire acted in the ordinary course of its own business. KVL
reasoned that the commissionaire only carried out activities within its own industry. No PE
was constituted for the Dutch company acting as the principal.
Far-reaching conclusions should not be made from KVL 68/1996.134 Recent European case
law shows that commissionaires have seldom been considered of an independent
character.135 Therefore, the commissionaire distributor model must primarily rely on its
ability to fall outside the scope of Article 5(5).
3.1.5 Interpretation of Article 5(5)—especially the “in the name of” requirement
The interpretation of Article 5(5), especially the expression “in the name of the enterprise”,
is the cornerstone for the success of the commissionaire distributor. A typical
commissionaire will not benefit from the independent agent exception in Article 5(6).
132 Para. 38.7 of the Commentaries on Article 5.
133 Para. 38.8 of the Commentaries on Article 5.
134 Same case as KHO 7.6.1996 T 1928.
135 See Chapter 3.1.5 for recent European case law.
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Therefore, the ability to avoid the constitution of a PE for the principal boils down to the
application of Article 5(5), most importantly the “in the name of” condition.
The matter at hand is whether the agency PE rule should only apply to an agent who enters
into contracts literally “in the name of the enterprise” or can the expression “in the name of”
be given the meaning of binding, as the Commentary suggests.136 Furthermore, it is of great
relevance to the commissionaire distributor model, whether binding is interpreted as
requiring legal bindingness, or should binding be interpreted in a broader sense, thus
referring to something of an economic or factual nature.
As Pijl (2013a) argues, Article 31(4) of the VCLT requires that a meaning, other than what
grammatical interpretation would imply, is given to a treaty term when it has been
established that the parties intended this.137 Furthermore, based on thorough analysis of
historical OECD, League of Nations and UN records and considering the genesis of Article
5(5), Pijl concludes that the expressions “in the name of”, “on behalf of” and “binding” have
all been intended to hold the same meaning.138 Avery Jones and Ward (1993) conclude that
the expression “in the name of” means also binding, at least in the civil law context.139 In
conclusion, both Pijl and Avery Jones and Ward agree that in a civil law context the
expression “in the name of” should be given the meaning of binding.140 This interpretation
has been generally accepted by scholars.141 Interestingly, the US Model uses the expression
“are binding on”, instead of “in the name of”.142
136 Para. 32.1 of the Commentaries on Article 5.
137 It is noteworthy, that pursuant to Article 2(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention, it does not actually apply to
model tax treaties. However, international agreements concluded between States are within the scope.
Therefore, actual DTCs should be interpreted in accordance.
138 Pijl 2013a, pp. 13–14.
139 Avery Jones – Ward 1993, p. 156.
140 The discrepancies in interpretations of Pijl and Avery Jones and Ward relate to different understandings on
the relationship between Articles 5(5) and 5(6). Pijl has developed a conceptual system, the ”integration
system”, wherein first independent agents that meet the conditions of Article 5(6) are excluded and only after
then Article 5(5) should be consulted to determine whether the dependent agent constitutes a PE. Avery Jones
and Ward see the conceptual system differently. According to them, Article 5(5) is the main rule and Article
5(6) is the exception. Pijl (2013) has referred to this understanding as the ”main rule/exception system or
model”. With regard to commissionaires, both Pijl’s ”integration system” and Avery Jones and Ward’s ”main
rule/exception system” lead to the same result. As Pijl notes, the choice of a system does not matter in practice.
As a general rule, a civil law commissionaire should not constitute a PE. See Pijl 2013a, pp. 7–10; See Avery
Jones – Ward 1993, p. 178. See also Roberts 1993 on a different interpretation, wherein Article 5(5) and (6)
are considered independent PE-constituting rules. Robert’s system is no longer in accordance with the
Commentary and has been heavily criticized. See Pijl 2013a on Robert’s critique.
141 See Arnold 2016, Chapter ” 3.2. The authority to conclude contracts in the name of the enterprise”.
142 See Article 5(5) of the US Model.
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The second question is whether binding is interpreted as requiring de jure bindingness, or
should it be interpreted in a broader, economic or factual sense. The former interpretation is
referred to as the legalistic approach, where the principal is required to be legally bound by
the agent’s contracts. The latter approach also suggests application to those contracts which
are not actually, strictly legally, binding on the enterprise and puts emphasis on the de facto
situation—the economic approach.143
Arnold (2016) finds that the abovementioned is still unresolved.144 On the contrary, Pijl
(2013a) is rather convinced that “to conclude contracts in the name of” is to be interpreted
as legally binding.145
In light of the most prominent case law, wherein Article 5(5) has been interpreted, de jure
bindingness has been required. Three European supreme court cases are outlined hereunder.
The courts’ focus has been on the phrase “authority to conclude contracts in the name of the
enterprise” of the OECD Model, which can be found as such in the DTCs subject to
interpretation.
One of the most prominent cases on the matter is The French Supreme Administrative
Court’s Zimmer case from the year 2010. In Zimmer, a UK company Zimmer Ltd, had
concluded a typical commissionaire agreement with Zimmer France, a company belonging
to the same group as the UK company, in 1995.146 Prior to the conclusion of this contract,
the French company had gone through a business restructuring, in which it was converted
from a traditional distributor into a commissionaire. The UK entity was the only client of
the French company, it was economically fully dependent on the UK entity, and the risks
were borne by the UK entity. The commissionaire also received detailed instructions from
the UK entity and was remunerated on a commission basis. All the agreements with the final
customers were concluded in the name of the French company.147
143 See Daxkobler 2014 for a comprehensive review of the discussion regarding this issue.
144 Arnold 2016, Chapter “3.2.1.4. The need to legally or economically bind the enterprise”.
145 Pijl’s argument is based on his grammatical, historical and contextual interpretation. See Pijl 2013a, pp. 14–
15.
146 The DTC subject to interpretation was the France–United Kingdom DTC, concluded on 22 May 1968. The
countries have entered into a new DTC on 19 June 2008, however, the relevant provisions have not been
amended.
147 International Tax Law Reports 2010; For a detailed review and analysis of the Zimmer case, See Gouthière
2010 pp. 350–358.
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The French tax authorities challenged the arrangement and claimed that Zimmer France
constituted a PE of Zimmer UK. To this end, with regard to taxation of business profits, the
authority’s assessments were upheld in lower instances. However, The Supreme
Administrative Court held that the words “acting in the name of” must be interpreted as
binding. Further, the court concluded that under civil law, the conditions under which an
agent has the authority to bind the principal have to be examined purely from a legal
standpoint, thus adopting the legalistic approach. Under French commercial law, similarly
to other civil law jurisdictions, a commissionaire cannot legally bind the principal.
Therefore, the court set the principle that a commissionaire may not be regarded as a PE and
that only a legal power to bind the principal is relevant in determining whether an agent
constitutes a PE.148
A similar structure was put in place in the renowned Dell case, wherein, in line with Zimmer,
the Supreme Court of Norway held that a commissionaire arrangement did not constitute an
agency PE.149 An Irish company, Dell Products, had entered into a commissionaire
agreement with a Norwegian subsidiary of the same group, Dell AS. The Norwegian
subsidiary sold in its own name, the products of Dell Products under a commissionaire
agreement. The Norwegian subsidiary was remunerated on a commission basis. The
commission was set low due to the fact that sales were done at the economic risk and account
of Dell Products.150
In line with most civil law jurisdictions, Norwegian law provides that a commissionaire
cannot legally bind the principal.151 Furthermore, the Court refused to bypass the clear
148 Gouthière 2010 pp. 350–358; Gouthière notes that there is no mention of the Commentaries in Zimmer and
that Paragraph 32.1. of the Commentary was introduced after the conclusion of the DTC subject to
interpretation in this case. Regardless, Gouthière is of the opinion that the same conclusion should be drawn
regarding tax treaties concluded after the adoption of the current Commentaries; Daxkobler 2014, p. 116.
149 The Supreme Court considered the Zimmer decision relevant also in this case.
150 International Tax Law Reports 2011; Leegaard 2012; It is also noteworthy that, at the time, the group had
put in place a similar structure in 15 other countries, without agency PE issues being raised, except for Spain
where a similar structure was considered to constitute an agency PE in the Dell Spain case. As Jiménez 2016
argues, in Dell Spain the Spanish High Court disregarded the wording of Article 5(5) of the OECD Model, the
Commentary and Spanish domestic legislation to adopt the economic approach. In June 2016, the Spanish
Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision by ruling against the appellant’s position and found that the
taxpayer had a “fixed place of business”, in the meaning of Article 5(1). With regard to commissionaires, far-
reaching conclusions cannot be drawn from the ruling because the PE status was grounded on the general PE
rule. The Supreme Court did also find an agency PE. However, such conclusion can be regarded as obiter dicta.
See Osborne Clarke 2016; In the author’s view, the reasoning in Dell Spain does not represent the correct
interpretation of tax treaty law. Rather, the interpretation is a reaction to secure the tax base in favor of the
state’s interests.
151 See Norwegian Commissionaire Act (Lov om kommisjon; 1916-06-30-1).
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wording of Article 5(5) of the Norway–Ireland DTC, which is identical to the provision in
the OECD Model.152 Therefore, similarly to Conseil d'État in Zimmer, the Supreme Court
held that in order for an agency PE to be constituted, the principal must be legally bound by
the agent’s contracts. What is interesting, is that the Norwegian Supreme Court also
discussed the impact of Paragraph 32.1 in the Commentary. The court stated that the
Paragraph was partly intended to clarify specific issues arising from commissionaire
arrangements under common law, which were not relevant in Norway. For the other part, it
was considered with proof of whether or not binding contracts exist, which was not in
question here. Therefore, no part of the Paragraph was relevant to the case at hand.153
In Boston Scientific International, the Boston Scientific group had put in place a
commissionaire arrangement in Italy, where an Italian subsidiary sold the products of its
Dutch parent company, Boston Scientific BV. In line with Zimmer and Dell, the Supreme
Court held that the Italian subsidiary did not constitute a PE of the Dutch principal in the
situation where the Italian subsidiary acted in its own name. Legal bindingness would have
been required for the constitution of an agency PE.154
In line with the most prominent supreme court cases mentioned above, wherein courts have
defined “in the name of” as equivalent to legally binding, Pijl (2013a) and Avery Jones and
Ward (1993), with different reasoning, come to the same conclusion that “acting in the name
of” shall be interpreted as demanding the agent to act in such way that the contracts are
binding on the principal.155 Other theories which do not conform to the prevailing
interpretation, have also been presented. However, after decades of debate, the prevailing
interpretation of Article 5(5) is clear.156
Given the above mentioned interpretations of the agency PE concept by the French,
Norwegian and Italian supreme courts, the phrase “authority to conclude contracts in the
name of the enterprise” should be interpreted as authority to conclude legally binding
152 Article 5(5) of the Convention between Ireland and the Kingdom of Norway for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, 22 Nov 2000.
153 Arnold 2012 p. 254 has heavily criticized the Norwegian Supreme Court’s reasoning in Dell, stating
however that he considered the decision ”probably correct”.
154 International Tax Law Reports 2012b; See Persiani 2012; See Daxkobler 2014, p. 120.
155 Pijl 2013b, p. 97; Avery Jones – Ward 1993, p. 178; See Daxkobler 2014 for a comprehensive review.
156 See Piltz 2004, p. 199, who takes the view that the ”in the name of” condition is only fulfilled if an agent
explicitly declares or expresses that he is not acting for himself. See Daxkobler 2014, for a rather different
approach adopted by Roberts, accepting that indirect representatives constitute agency PEs.
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contracts. In other words, the legalistic approach should be adopted. Even though in some
cases courts have reached opposite conclusions with highly questionable reasoning, it is
clear that the legalistic approach is the prevailing interpretation in civil law jurisdictions and
a typical commissionaire arrangement should not constitute a PE.157 It is also worth
mentioning that the OECD and G20 agree that the current Article 5(5) relies on the formal
conclusion of contracts in the name of the foreign enterprise.158
As MNEs’ tax planning activities have shown, the implications of this interpretation have
been substantial. Commissionaire arrangements enable effective circumvention of the
application of Article 5. In fact, a typical commissionaire will not fall within the scope of
the general PE rule in Article 5(1) of the OECD Model. Even though a commissionaire can
seldom be considered to fall within the independent agent exception, an agency PE is not
constituted because the arrangement also falls outside the application of Article 5(5) in civil
law jurisdictions. As long as laws of the country of residence of the commissionaire provide
that a commissionaire cannot legally bind the principal, commissionaires slip through the
fingers of the source state’s tax authorities.
3.2 OECD BEPS Action 7
The OECD and G20 have adopted a 15-point Action Plan to address BEPS in September
2013. The 15 actions have now been completed and the outputs have been consolidated into
a comprehensive package. Action 7 on preventing the artificial avoidance of PE status sets
forth a re-evaluation of the existing definition of PE. The amendments to the agency PE
definition specifically target commissionaire arrangements.
OECD released its Final Report on Action 7 in October 2015.159 The wording of Action 7
has been materialized in the MLI, which is a multilateral instrument adopted for the purpose
of swiftly amending existing tax treaties. The instrument contains the four articles arising
from the work on Action 7 and was published in November 2016. Specifics with regard to
the MLI are further discussed in Chapter 4.1.2.
157 See Jiménez 2016 and Daxkobler 2014 pp. 117–119 on the mistaken interpretation of the agency PE concept
in Roche; See International Tax Law Reports 2012a; See Aalto 2002, p. 439; See Arnold 2016, Chapter 3.6.2.1.
”The relevance of article 5(5) of the OECD Model”.
158 OECD 2015d, p. 10.
159 OECD 2015d.
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The UN has also proposed amendments to the UN Model to help address BEPS. In
November 2016, the Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters
published a paper with proposals addressing possible changes relating to PEs. Pursuant to
the paper, the Committee set forth two alternative options to broaden the scope of the agent
PE rule. The first option is based on OECD’s Action 7. The second option also mainly
adheres to Action 7. However, the option removes certain wording which, in the
Committee’s view, might be confusing or adversely limiting the scope of application of the
PE provision. Deviations from Action 7 are highlighted to a relevant extent in the following
Chapter.160
3.2.1 Drafting of Action 7
The OECD’s work has been a multi-step process, which has led to the formulation of PE
provisions now included in the MLI. The work on Action 7 was initially carried out by the
OECD Focus Group on Artificial Avoidance of PE Status, which discussed BEPS concerns
in connection with the definition of PE. Different schemes for avoidance of PE status were
also identified, most importantly the commissionaire. The Focus Group’s work lead to the
First Discussion Draft, released in October 2014.161
The First Discussion Draft laid down four alternatives, A, B, C and D, to amend the
definition of agency PE, which would better reflect the policy objectives of the OECD
member states.162 Interested parties were invited to comment the alternatives.163
A subsidiary body of the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Working Party 1 on Tax
Conventions and Related Questions continued the drafting process. Seven months later, in
May 2015, a Revised Discussion Draft was published.164 Option B, which was preferred by
a vast majority of stakeholder commentators, was adopted as the basic structure of the new
agency PE provision.165
160 United Nations 2016.
161 OECD 2014b.
162 See OECD 2014b p. 6 on policy objectives.
163 See OECD 2015a and OECD 2015b.
164 OECD 2015b.
165 At this point, it was agreed that the term “associated enterprises” used in a draft of Article 5(6) should be
replaced with a narrower concept. Furthermore, the Working Party 1 agreed that the Article should not
automatically exclude unrelated agents acting exclusively for one enterprise either.
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Four months later, in October 2015, the Final Report was published. Compared to the
Revised Discussion Draft, the Final Report includes some changes reflecting the interested
parties’ concerns along with some further clarifications.
3.2.2 Final Report
As stated, Action 7 sets forth multiple amendments to the existing definition of PE with
relevance to commissionaire arrangements. In consequence, new wordings of Article 5(5)
and 5(6) were introduced. However, current provisions will remain partly unchanged. To the
extent not discussed hereunder, current treaty provisions and Commentaries thereto are
considered to remain unchanged.
Action 7 proposes amendments to Articles 5(4), 5(5) and 5(6) of the OECD Model.
Therefore, the wording of the general PE definition set forth in Art 5(1), the positive list in
Article 5(2) and Article 5(7) remain unchanged. The proposed new wording of the amended
paragraphs and respective amendments to the Commentary are studied in the following.
The changes to Articles 5(5) and 5(6) and the Commentary specifically target
commissionaire structures and similar strategies. According to the view of the OECD and
G20, they were put in place primarily in order to erode the taxable base of the source state
where sales took place. The report gives examples of similar strategies, which are also
targeted by amending the said paragraphs. Such strategies include arrangements where
contracts, which are substantially negotiated in one state, are finalized or authorized abroad
and not within scope of the current Article 5(5). Further, the OECD and G20 seek to apply
the new Article 5(5) to situations previously within the Article 5(6) exception. These include
situations where a closely related person habitually exercises an authority to conclude
contracts. It is clarified in the report that similar strategies do not include LRD
arrangements.166
3.2.3 The new agency PE rule
The new wording of Article 5(5) reads as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 but subject to the
provisions of paragraph 6, where a person is acting in a Contracting State on
behalf of an enterprise and, in doing so, habitually concludes contracts, or
166 OECD 2015, p. 15.
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habitually plays the principal role leading to the conclusion of contracts that
are routinely concluded without material modification by the enterprise, and
these contracts are
a) in the name of the enterprise, or  
b) for the transfer of the ownership of, or for the granting of the right to use,
property owned by that enterprise or that the enterprise has the right to use,
or  
c) for the provision of services by that enterprise,  
that enterprise shall be deemed to have a permanent establishment in that State
in respect of any activities which that person undertakes for the enterprise,
unless the activities of such person are limited to those mentioned in paragraph
4 which, if exercised through a fixed place of business, would not make this
fixed place of business a permanent establishment under the provisions of that
paragraph.
Three conditions must be met, in order for the new agency PE rule set for the in Article 5(5)
to be applicable. These three conditions are cumulative. However, alternatives are provided
within the latter two conditions. The second condition has two alternatives and the third
condition has four, one of which must be fulfilled.
Under the new wording of Article 5(5), an agency PE would be constituted where the
person’s activities fulfill the following conditions:
1) Acts on behalf of an enterprise, and
2) In doing so
a. habitually concludes contracts, or
b. plays the principal role leading to the conclusion of contracts that are
routinely concluded without material modification by the enterprise, and
3) these contracts are
a. in the name of the enterprise, or
b. for the transfer of the ownership of, or
c. for the granting of the right to use, property owned by that enterprise or that
the enterprise has the right to use, or
d. for the provision of services by that enterprise
Acting on behalf of an enterprise
Firstly, a person in a contracting state shall act on behalf of an enterprise. This condition is
a reproduction of the current OECD Model. One is acting “on behalf of an enterprise” when
such person involves that enterprise in business activities to a particular extent in the state
concerned. The enterprise shall be at least indirectly affected by the person’s actions, in order
to satisfy the first condition. The enterprise is affected in the meaning of the provision for
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example where an agent acts for a principal, a partner acts for a partnership, a director acts
for a company or where an employee acts for an employer.167
Also, the proposed Commentary would further clarify that a buy–sell distributor in a
particular market would not be considered to be acting “on behalf of an enterprise” when it
buys products from an enterprise and sells them to customers. The decisive requirement is
that the transfer of the title to the property sold is passed from the enterprise to the distributor
and from the distributor to the customer. Therefore, the distributor would receive a profit
from the sale. Even LRDs, which would only hold the title to the property for a very limited
period and buy the product from an associated enterprise, would be regarded as not acting
“on behalf of an enterprise”.168
Habitually concludes contracts, or habitually plays the principal role leading to the
conclusion of contracts
Secondly, that person shall habitually conclude contracts, or habitually play the principal
role leading to the conclusion of contracts that are routinely concluded without material
modification by the enterprise. Hence, it is clear that the actions of the person have to go
beyond mere promotion, advertising or marketing, i.e. activities which in itself do not
directly lead to the conclusion of contracts. It is also noteworthy that such contract-
concluding activity shall take place repeatedly and not merely in isolated cases. The
requirement of “habitually” concluding contracts implies that the enterprise’s presence in a
contracting state should be more than merely transitory. However, no specific frequency test
is laid down. Rather, the Commentary settles for a more general requirement, according to
which the threshold for habitual activity will “depend on the nature of the contracts and the
business of the principal”.169
Pursuant to the Commentary, the term “concludes contracts” refers to situations where,
“under the relevant law governing contracts, a contract is considered to have been concluded
by a person”.170 If the relevant law provides, the contract may be considered to have been
“concluded” in that state even though it was entered into without any active negotiation of
167 Para. 32.3 of the proposed Commentary. OECD 2015, p. 18.
168 Para. 32.12 of the proposed Commentary. OECD 2015, p. 21.
169 Paras. 32, 32.5 and 33.1 of the proposed Commentary. OECD 2015, pp. 17–19 and 22.
170 According to Finnish legal doctrine, concluding contracts is not limited to the ways described in the
Contracts Act. However, the Commentary only refers to concluding “under the relevant law governing
contracts”. Therefore, other ways of entering into contracts are not relevant here.
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the terms of contract or it was signed outside that state.171 An example of “concluding
contracts” pursuant to Finnish contract law is set forth hereunder.
Pursuant to the Finnish Contracts Act (228/1929), contracts are concluded by an offer to
conclude a contract and the acceptance of such an offer. The recipient’s expression of
intention is either an acceptance or a rejection. An acceptance may also be expressed by
fulfilling the offer without giving specific acceptance. Also, an implied expression of intent
is considered effective in Finnish contract law. An expression of intent is implied when the
willingness to be bound to the contract is not specifically expressed. In such case, the party
in actual fact acts in accordance with the contract. For example, if a distributor delivers a
product requested by the buyer, without specifically expressing acceptance to the buyer’s
offer, the dispatching of the product may be considered an implied expression of intent.172
Therefore, when the rules of interpretation of the relevant DTC lead interpretation of treaty
terms in accordance with Finnish law, a contract may be concluded without any active
negotiation of the terms of that contract.173
Under Finnish law, an agreement is concluded when the recipient of the offer expresses
acceptance. This is however subject to two conditions set forth in the Finnish Contracts Act.
Section 4(1) provides that such an acceptance shall not reach the offeror too late, otherwise
the acceptance is deemed to constitute a new offer made by the original acceptor. In such
case, the contract is concluded only when the original offeror accepts the new offer.
Secondly, pursuant to Section 6(1), a reply that purports to be an acceptance but which, due
to an addition, restriction or condition, does not correspond to the offer, shall be deemed a
rejection constituting a new offer. Again, in such case, the contract is concluded only when
the original offeror accepts the new offer.
Therefore, the signing of the contract is not a decisive factor “under the relevant law
governing contracts”. If the contract has been entered into in accordance with the Finnish
Contracts Act, it does not matter that the contract is later signed abroad. However, it is to be
noted that the freedom of contract allows the parties to agree on the terms of conclusion of
171 Para. 32.4 of the proposed Commentary. OECD 2015, pp. 18–19.
172 See Saarnilehto 2009 pp.16 and 48; Hoppu – Hoppu 2011, p. 47.
173 For example, see Chapter 6 of the Finnish Consumer Protection Act (1211/2013); Contracts of standard
form or contracts which require performance in order to become effective, are not always concluded in the
manner presented here. Specific provisions apply, inter alia, to door-to-door selling and distance selling to
customers.
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contracts. Furthermore, in many situations, it might be difficult to determine whether the
acceptor has accepted the offer by an implied expression of intent. In such case, the signing
of the contract may be considered a circumstance which best illustrates the conclusion of the
contract.
The second condition also includes an additional test focusing on substantive activities, i.e.
when a person plays “the principal role leading to the conclusion of the contract”. The test
is applied where, under the relevant rules of contract law, the contract is not concluded by
that person in that State, but rather, the rules provide that the conclusion of the contract takes
place outside that State. The test aims to cover situations where in reality, the conclusion of
a contract directly results from the actions that the person performs on behalf of the
enterprise. Such actions could for example be convincing a third party to enter into a contract
with the enterprise, receiving orders or requesting offers from third parties but not formally
finalizing these contracts.174
The proposed Commentary sets forth two examples of situations, regarding the “principal
role leading to the conclusion of the contract” condition.175 The first example considers the
pharmaceutical industry, where representatives of a pharmaceutical enterprise actively
promote drugs produced by that enterprise. There representatives engage in marketing
activities, such as contacting doctors. Even though the marketing activities would lead in
doctors subsequently prescribing these drugs, in the light of the proposed Commentary, that
marketing activity does not directly result in the conclusion of contracts between the doctors
and the enterprise. In conclusion, the first example entails that marketing with indirect
effects, such as effect on future purchasing decisions, will not exceed the new agency PE
threshold.
The second example (Diagram 3) encompasses a company (RCO) distributing products and
providing services worldwide through its websites. The company has a fully-owned
subsidiary (SCO) in the customer jurisdiction (State S). The subsidiary’s employees engage
in marketing activities (emails, telephone calls and visits) in order to convince customers to
buy the parent company’s products and services. SCO can be described as a traditional MSC
entity. The employees of the subsidiary are considered responsible for large accounts in the
source jurisdiction and their remuneration is partially based on the revenues derived from
174 Para. 32.5 of the proposed Commentary. OECD 2015, p. 19.
175 Paras. 32.5 and 32.6 of the proposed Commentary. OECD 2015, pp. 19–20.
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these accounts. The employees also use their relationship building skills to try to anticipate
the needs of these customers. When a customer is convinced to buy products and services,
the employee indicates the price and explains the parent company’s standard terms of
contract, which the employees are not authorized to modify. The employee also instructs
that a contract must be concluded on-line with the parent company. The customer
subsequently concludes that contract on-line. In the light of the proposed Commentary, the
employees play “the principal role” leading to the conclusion of the contract and such
contracts are routinely concluded without material modification by the enterprise. Even
though the subsidiary’s employees cannot vary the terms of contract, the conclusion of
contracts is considered a direct result of the activities that they perform on behalf of the
enterprise.
Diagram 3
Alternative 2)b) also includes the phrase “contracts that are routinely concluded without
material modification by the enterprise”. Interestingly, the UN Committee of Experts on
International Cooperation in Tax Matters has observed, that this addition might be confusing
or adversely limiting the scope of application of the agency PE provision and has proposed
an option to remove the said phrase.176
Clearly, the UN is looking to adopt a broader agency PE concept. Initially, this ought to have
been the OECD’s intention as well. In the Revised Discussion Draft, alternative 2)b) was
176 United Nations 2016, p. 23.
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phrased ”negotiates the material elements of contracts”.177 However, stakeholder
commentators considered this formulation way too broad.178
Whether not the UN opt for the broader phrase or the alternative set forth in Action 7, the
choice should not have relevance on the PE status of commissionaires. There is no doubt
that commissionaires “conclude contracts” in the meaning of Article 5(5). Rather, the choice
is material for MSC structures and may have an effect on the whether a MSC’s activities
constitute a PE or not.
Contracts in the name of the enterprise
The third condition consists of three alternative points, of which one has to be fulfilled in
order to constitute an agency PE. For Article 5(5) to apply, contracts shall be “in the name
of the enterprise or for the transfer of the ownership of, or for the granting of the right to use,
property owned by that enterprise or that the enterprise has the right to use, or for the
provision of services by that enterprise”.
Similar to the current wording of Article 5(5), the proposed wording will cover situations
where the contracts create legally enforceable rights and obligations between the principal
and clients, therefore being “in the name of the enterprise”. Such contracts are typically
concluded by an agent, a partner or an employee of an enterprise.179
The proposed Commentary seeks to clarify that the application of Article 5(5) shall no longer
be limited only to contracts legally binding between the enterprise to third parties. At least
points b) and c) of the threefold third condition will cover such situations. Also, the proposed
Commentary directly points out that the phrase “in the name of” will no longer restrict the
application only to concluding contracts literally “in the name of” the enterprise or contracts
legally binding on the enterprise. Whether contracts are “in the name of” is no longer
material because the alternative provisions cover a broad range of other relevant
arrangements.180
177 OECD 2012, p. 13
178 See OECD 2015a.
179 See Para. 32.8 of the proposed Commentary. OECD 2015, p. 20.
180 Para. 32.9 of the proposed Commentary. OECD 2015, p. 20.
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Contracts for the transfer of the ownership of, or for the granting of the right to use, property
owned by that enterprise or that the enterprise has the right to use, or for the provision of
services
The term “property” covers any type of tangible or intangible property and it does not matter
whether or not the property concerned existed or was owned by the enterprise at the time of
the conclusion of the contract.181
The proposed Commentary sets forth a decisive requirement for the application of conditions
3)b), 3)c) and 3)d). The person acting on behalf of the enterprise and satisfying the first and
second condition must not perform the parts of the contracts relating to the transfer of
property or provision of services oneself. Instead, these activities must be performed by the
enterprise, i.e. the principal.182 Therefore, to fulfill the conditions, a person acting on behalf
of the enterprise must sell the enterprise’s products, not products owned by the person itself.
In consequence, where the person acting on behalf of the enterprise takes title to the products,
this requirement is not fulfilled.
The proposed Article 5(5) will broaden the scope to target commissionaire arrangements,
which have so far relied on the formal interpretation of the agency PE rule, namely the “in
the name of requirement”. To make the OECD’s and G20’s view even more clear, the
proposed Commentary articulates that at least point 3)b) or 3)c) will apply to
commissionaires’ contracts, regardless the fact that they are not literally “in the name of the
enterprise”.183
3.2.4 The new independent agent exception
As described earlier, also the independent agent exception set forth in Article 5(6) is relevant
when evaluating the constitution of an agency PE. In consequence of the new agency PE
rule, the threshold for the application of Article 5(5) will be significantly lowered and more
structures will fall within scope. Therefore, the relevance of Article 5(6) as an exception to
the agency PE rule is likely to increase.
Article 5(6) has been fully redone in Action 7. Subparagraph a) of the new Article 5(6) reads
as follows:
181 Para. 32.11 of the proposed Commentary. OECD 2015, p. 21.
182 Para. 32.10 of the proposed Commentary. OECD 2015, pp. 20–21.
183 Para. 32.8 of the proposed Commentary. OECD 2015, p. 20.
54
a) Paragraph 5 shall not apply where the person acting in a Contracting State
on behalf of an enterprise of the other Contracting State carries on business
in the first-mentioned State as an independent agent and acts for the enterprise
in the ordinary course of that business. Where, however, a person acts
exclusively or almost exclusively on behalf of one or more enterprises to which
it is closely related, that person shall not be considered to be an independent
agent within the meaning of this paragraph with respect to any such enterprise.
The first sentence of Article 5(6)(a) sets forth two cumulative and positive conditions which
define the general scope of the independent agent exception. An agency PE is not
constituted, even though Article 5(5) would apply, where the agent:
1) is an independent agent and;
2) acts for the enterprise in the ordinary course of that business.
In substance, these conditions are very similar to the current Article 5(6). What has changed,
however, is that the provision no longer refers to an “agent of independent status”. Rather,
the term has been changed to “independent agent”. Furthermore, the updated Commentary
would not include a general mention that the agent must be “economically” independent.
With regard to the independence of the agent, the last sentence of the recommended Article
5(6)(a) sets forth a negative requirement, i.e. one can be considered an independent agent
only where the last sentence does not apply. A person acting “exclusively or almost
exclusively on behalf of one or more closely related enterprises” is not considered
independent. The aforementioned renders that employees and partners, acting on behalf their
employer or partnership, are categorically excluded from the scope of the exception.184
Moreover, the words “exclusively or almost exclusively” mean that acting on behalf of non-
related parties should represent a significant part of an independent agent’s business.
Pursuant to the proposed Commentary, less than 10 per cent of sales for unrelated parties,
i.e. all other sales for closely related parties, would not represent such a significant part.185
The concept of “closely related enterprises” for the purposes of the entire Article 5 is defined
in Article 5(6)(b).
In addition to being an independent agent, one has to act in the ordinary course of that
business—“that business” referring to the agent’s own business. Therefore, acting in the
184 Para. 37 of the proposed Commentary. OECD 2015, p. 23.
185 Para. 38.8 of the proposed Commentary. OECD 2015, p. 26.
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ordinary course of one’s own business means performing activities that are related and
expedient to the agent. This condition corresponds to the current Article 5(6).
Article 5(6)(b) defines the concept of closely related enterprises186:
b) For the purposes of this Article, a person is closely related to an enterprise
if, based on all the relevant facts and circumstances, one has control of the
other or both are under the control of the same persons or enterprises. In any
case, a person shall be considered to be closely related to an enterprise if one
possesses directly or indirectly more than 50 per cent of the beneficial interest
in the other (or, in the case of a company, more than 50 per cent of the
aggregate vote and value of the company’s shares or of the beneficial equity
interest in the company) or if another person possesses directly or indirectly
more than 50 per cent of the beneficial interest (or, in the case of a company,
more than 50 per cent of the aggregate vote and value of the company’s shares
or of the beneficial equity interest in the company) in the person and the
enterprise.
Firstly, the general rule on close relation is set forth in the first sentence.187 A person is
closely related to an enterprise if the principal has control over the agent, or vice versa, or
both are under mutual control. In this evaluation, all the relevant facts and circumstances are
considered.
The second sentence of Article 5(6)(b) provides alternative situations where a person is
automatically considered a “person closely related to an enterprise”. This is the case if:
a) the principal possesses, directly or indirectly more than 50 per cent of the
i. beneficial interest in the agent, or vice versa; or
ii. aggregate vote and value of the company’s shares or of the beneficial equity
interest in the agent’s company, or vice versa, or if
b) another person possesses directly or indirectly more than 50 per cent of the
i. beneficial interest in the agent and the principal; or
ii. beneficial equity interest in the agent’s and the principal’s companies.
Under the abovementioned circumstances, the closely related person falling within Article
5(5) will be unable to benefit from the independent agent exception. However, an agency
PE is not constituted only by virtue of being closely related. The agent must also fall within
the scope of Article 5(5).188
186 Earlier discussion drafts used the terms ”associated enterprises” and “person connected to an enterprise”.
However, the OECD did not adopt such broad and criticized concepts.
187 The proposed Commentary would distinguish the concepts of closely related persons and associated
enterprises used for the purposes of Article 9 of the OECD Model. It is somewhat ambiguously stated, however,
that these concepts overlap to a certain extent. See Para. 38.9 of the proposed Commentary. OECD 2015, p.
26.
188 Para. 38.12 of the proposed Commentary. OECD 2015, p. 26–27.
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3.2.5 Commissionaires under the new PE provisions
The updated agency PE provision and exceptions thereto will not change the fundamentals
of the agency PE. An agency PE will continue to be deemed PE, constituted by virtue of the
activities performed by the agent. Article 5(5) will also continue to be subject to the
exceptions and limitations set forth in Paragraphs 4 and 6 of Article 5. The threshold for
being an independent agent is higher than before. Therefore, it can be concluded that
commissionaire distributors are seldom—if ever—independent in the meaning of Article 5.
Like before, to avoid PE constitution, the commissionaire must fall outside the scope of the
new Article 5(5) as well.
With regard to commissionaire distributors, the new lowered agency PE threshold will
change the playing field. Even though commissionaire distributors will continue to conclude
contracts in the name of the commissionaire, not “in the name of the enterprise”, the new
substantive conditions for PE constitution will cover commissionaires. To this end, it is clear
that commissionaire distributors conclude contracts “for the transfer of the ownership of”
property owned by the principal.
However, what the new agency PE rule does not clarify, is the meaning of the phrase “on
behalf of”. Like its predecessor, the wording of the new Article 5(5) requires that the
commissionaire must act on behalf of its principal to constitute a PE for the latter. Like with
the current wording, a certain interrelation between the agent’s and principal’s activities can
also be required. Even though the phrase has not been given an explicit definition in the
respective Commentary, the phrase “on behalf of” is used in national tax law provisions to
refer to an activity of an economic or factual nature. It can thus be concluded that a formal
interpretation is not required, as proven in Chapter 3.1.3. Therefore, the concept “acting on
behalf of an enterprise” shall be given the meaning of “acting on behalf of an enterprise” in
an economic or factual manner.
It appears that, at least to certain extent, the OECD and G20 have achieved their goal to
reform the agency PE provision. All key conditions for PE constitution are now substantive,
rather than formal. As described earlier, up until now the commissionaire distributor model
has relied on the formal interpretation of Article 5(5). Under the new substance-over-form
rules, the commissionaire distributor model is unlikely to be able to benefit from the
interpretive limitations in international tax law. The lowered PE threshold is likely to have
a PE-constituting effect on commissionaire distributors.
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3.3 Finnish national legislation
The threshold for source state taxation in Finnish national legislation is defined in the Income
Tax Act (1535/1992; TVL), in particular Sections 9, 10 and 13(a) (1549/1995). This
threshold is most relevant in cases where a DTC does not apply. However, also in situations
where a DTC is applicable, the grounds for levying a tax must be found within national acts
of Parliament, such as the TVL.
Pursuant to Section 9 of the TVL, Finnish residents, including local entities operating as
commissionaire distributors, have an unlimited tax liability in Finland.189 Non-resident
entities have limited tax liability. This means that they are liable for tax only for Finnish-
sourced income.190
Before studying the national PE concept, it must be resolved whether PE constitution is
actually a precondition for levying a tax on the business income of a non-resident entity.
Clearly, this is the case where an OECD Model-based DTC applies. The wording of the TVL
does not clearly answer this question. According to Section 9(1), a non-resident entity is
liable for tax for Finnish-sourced income. Further, pursuant to Section 9(3), if a foreign
corporate entity has a PE in Finland, it must pay tax on all the income that can be attributed
to that PE. The concept of Finnish-sourced income is further defined in Section 10(1). Point
2 stipulates that income from a business, profession, agriculture or forestry is Finnish-
sourced income.191 The wording of these two provisions and the Finnish PE concept renders
unclear the relationship between the provisions.
As Malmgrén (2008) has shown, commentators have presented diverging views on whether
and in which situations PE constitution is a precondition for levying a tax on the business
income of a non-resident entity. In the author’s view, interpretation in accordance with the
wording of Section 9 entails, that PE status is not an imperative precondition for source state
taxation, as long as income is Finnish-sourced.192 Furthermore, The Finnish Tax
189 Only ”domestic corporate bodies”, i.e. corporate bodies established under the laws of Finland, are subject
to unlimited tax liability. All other corporate bodies are subject to limited tax liability. See Section 9(1) of the
TVL.
190 All entities that are established under the laws other than Finnish law have limited tax liability in Finland.
See KVL 2015/2.
191 The list provided in Section 10 is non-exhaustive, thus not restricting the application of Section 9. However,
defining the list as non-exhaustive cannot broaden the scope of application either.
192 Pursuant to Section 83 of the VML a tax may be levied on the income of a non-resident entity, which is
engaged in business activities, even where a Finnish PE does not exist. It is problematic that the said provision
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Administration has taken the view that unless a DTC limits the right to a levy tax, there is a
taxing right also where no PE exists in Finland.193 Most commentators have settled to agree
that levying taxes on Finnish-sourced business profits is possible where no Section 13(a) PE
exists if a DTC does not prevent taxation.194
The aforementioned conclusion has been heavily criticized. As Malmgrén notes, source state
taxation is difficult to justify in situations where no PE exists. Furthermore, in practice, the
PE concept has been considered a de facto threshold for business income taxation.195 Such
view can be supported with the circumstance that, at least to the author’s knowledge, there
is no published Finnish case law where a foreign entity would have been taxed for business
income without a PE in accordance with national law.196 Therefore, it can be argued that a
PE as precondition has become established practice. Regardless of the non-satisfactory
provisions of the TVL, PE constitution should at least be considered a practical precondition
for levying a tax on the business income of a non-resident entity.
If an enterprise, without a PE in the meaning of Section 13(a), would be taxed for business
income in Finland, Malmgrén claims that the taxpayer could rely on the principle of
protection of legitimate expectations, at least where tax is levied retroactively.197 However,
in the author’s view, such protection could be relied upon only in very limited situations.
Such protection would require, inter alia, that the taxpayer acted in accordance with the
authority’s praxis or in accordance with issued guidance. Clearly, the guidance issued by the
Finnish Tax Administration would not support the taxpayer’s argument. Therefore, the
taxpayer must have acted in accordance with the authority’s praxis. This requirement was
further clarified in KHO 2010:50, where KHO stated that the authority’s praxis “means an
explicit commitment” to a matter just like the matter at hand. Therefore, the lack of published
has been placed in the VML. According to Section 1, only assessment procedure and appeals against assessed
tax are within the scope of the Act. The grounds for tax liability for business income are set forth in the TVL.
Therefore, Section 83 of the VML cannot be given much relevance in this consideration. Rather, the threshold
for source state taxation must be resolved by interpretation of the provisions of the TVL. However, Section 83
of the VML may be considered an indication of the legislator’s intention.
193 Verohallinto 2014, Chapter 6 ”Income tax treatment if no permanent establishment is in existence”.
194 See Andersson et al. 2016, p. 97 and Helminen 2016, Chapter 6, ”Forms of Doing Business and Business
Profits”, “Permanent Establishment”, ”Agent”.
195 See Malmgrén 2008, pp. 303–311.
196 Some case law does exist where PE constitution was considered a precondition for levying a tax on the
business income. However, in KHO 1977 B 510, the decision was based on the provisions of the DTC.
197 See Section 26(2) of the VML (477/1998) on the protection of legitimate expectations; Firstly, the matter
must be open to various interpretations and unclear. Secondly, the taxpayer must have acted in good faith and
in accordance with the authority’s praxis or in accordance with guidance.
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Finnish case law where a foreign entity would have been taxed for business income without
a Section 13(a) PE would not fulfill this requirement. It should also be taken into
consideration that non-resident enterprises operating in Finland without constituting a PE
would seldom be subject to any tax authority’s decision. Only where the taxpayer concerned
would have received an advance ruling from the KVL or could refer to a specific case similar
enough, such protection could be given to the taxpayer.
3.3.1 Definition of PE in the TVL
The definition of PE in Finnish national legislation is included in Section 13(a) of the TVL.
It reads as follows:
The term permanent establishment means a place where, for the permanent
carrying on of business, a specific place of business is located or where special
measures have been taken, such as a place, where the place of management,
branch, office, factory, production plant, workshop or shop or any other
permanent purchase facility or place of sales is located. The term permanent
establishment also includes an operational mine or another discovery, quarry,
peat bog, gravel pit or another comparable place, or parceled lots or real
estate to be parceled into lots in the commercial sale of real estate, these real
estates, and in building contract work, a place where such contract work has
been carried out to a significant extent, as well as in the business of line service
also the maintenance facility of the business or another specific place of
business servicing transportation.198
Firstly, there has to be either a “specific place of business” or a “place where special
measures have been taken”.199 Like the general PE rule in Article 5(1) of the OECD Model,
a place and a certain degree of permanence is required. A list of positive examples is also
laid down within the same Section.200
To this end, the national PE concept is slightly broader than that of the OECD Model. Section
13(a) does not specifically require that the business of the enterprise is carried on through
this specific place of business, like the OECD Model.201 Furthermore, the list of examples
in 13(a) is much more extensive than that of the OECD Model Article 5(2). It is also
noteworthy that in Section 13(a), the examples are alternatives to the place of business
198 Author’s translation.
199 In Finnish, ”erityinen liikepaikka” or ”paikka … jossa on ryhdytty erityisiin järjestelyihin”.
200 The government proposal on the current Section 13(a) suggests that the provision should be interpreted
similarly to the provisions in DTCs. See HE 76/1995 vp, p. 19.
201 Such difference is not significant, because in any case, the PE must be set up for the ”permanent carrying
on of business”.
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requirement. Therefore, the wording does not require that the activities listed would fulfill
the “specific place of business” requirement. Conversely, the examples in Article 5(2) of the
OECD Model are always subject to the requirements set forth in Article 5(1).
Secondly, Section 13(a) requires that there is a place for the “carrying on of business”.202 In
many jurisdictions such wording would not have material relevance. However, in Finland
source state taxation is only possible to the extent that the enterprise has income belonging
to the business source of income.203 With relevance to this study, this requirement will
certainly be fulfilled where the commissionaire distributor is engaged in the distribution of
tangible products.204
What is most significant in comparison of the OECD Model PE concept to Section 13(a), is
that the latter does not include a provision on agency PEs. A list of negative examples or a
provision on parent–subsidiary relationship is not included either. With relevance to this
study, the missing agency PE rule is of highest interest.
With respect to agents, the OECD Model PE concept seems much broader. However, in
other respects Section 13(a) is broader, and the OECD Model narrower, because preparatory
and auxiliary activities are not categorically out of the scope of the PE provision.
Regardless of the missing agency PE provision in Finnish national legislation, pursuant to
established tax praxis, a dependent agent may also constitute a PE under Section 13(a).205
One might question, how such interpretation is possible without breaching the fundamental
principles of tax law. As mentioned, DTCs cannot broaden the scope of national tax
provisions.
Such interpretation can be justified in two circumstances. Firstly, according to Section 13(a),
a PE exists where special measures have been taken, such as a place, where a permanent
purchase facility or place of sales is located.206 Therefore, in some situations an agent’s
202 Section 13(a) uses the Finnish term ”liiketoiminta”, which like the word ”elinkeinotoiminta”, translates into
”business”. The latter concept is considered broader. However, such difference is without relevance in this
context.
203 See  TVL  Section  29;  In  the  Finnish  system,  income  is  divided  into  three  different  sources  of  income:
business income, income from agriculture and other income (personal income). Such system is a Finnish
peculiarity. For example, in Sweden an entity’s income is always considered business income; On the relevance
of different sources of income, for example, see KHO 2013:42.
204 See Malmgrén 2008, p. 310.
205 See KVL 1996/68 (same as KHO 7.6.1996 T 1928); Malmgrén 2008, p. 313.
206 In Finnish ”pysyvä osto tai myyntipaikka”; Malmgrén 2008, p. 313.
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actions could fall within the scope, however, only where a “permanent place” is located.
This option would not cover nearly as many situations as would be covered by the OECD
Model.
Secondly, if it is accepted that PE status is not an imperative precondition for source state
taxation, the activities of an agent should be assessed in light of Section 10(1) of the TVL.
The second point of the Subsection stipulates that income from a business carried out here
or income from a profession is Finnish-sourced income.207
The second option would create an PE where the agent is in an employment relationship to
its principal, thus resolving some agency PE uncertainties. Apart from this, the second option
is clearly problematic. Constitution of an agency PE under 13(a) may be considered in
contradiction with Section 81 of the Constitution, which sets forth the emphasized principle
of legality. The significant difference between the two PE concepts is that under the OECD
Model, an agency PE is deemed by virtue of the agent’s activities. Quite differently, the
Finnish PE concept would require a “place” for PE constitution, without clear reference to
the agent’s activities.
The government proposal on the current Section 13(a) suggests that the provision should be
interpreted similarly to the provisions in DTCs, i.e. the OECD Model.208 However, the
agent’s non-resident principal could only be taxed where the national PE concept is
abandoned. Or, regarding the first option, Section 13(a) could only apply to agents where it
is accepted that they fall within the general definition of PE, for example where permanent
places of sale exist. To this end, the OECD Model has a completely different approach.
3.3.2 Excursion: Legislative solutions in Sweden
It is common practice that legislators and commentators refer to Swedish legislative
solutions in drafting and interpreting provisions. The Swedish legislative solutions are of
particular interest because, to a relevant extent, the legal systems in Sweden and Finland are
alike. Such finding holds true also with regard to tax laws and international taxation.
207 See Helminen 2016, Chapter 6, ”Forms of Doing Business and Business Profits”, “Permanent
Establishment”, ”Agent”; In Finnish, ”täällä harjoitetusta liikkeestä, ammatista, maataloudesta tai
metsätaloudesta saatu tulo”.
208 See HE 76/1995 vp, p. 19.
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Both countries’ DTC networks are primarily based on treaties which adhere to the OECD
Model. However, the wording of the PE provision in Chapter 2 Section 29 of the Swedish
Income Tax Act, is very different from the Finnish alternative.209 Unlike the Finnish national
PE concept, the definition of PE under the Swedish Income Tax Act is almost identical to
the definition in Article 5 of the OECD Model.210 It is intended to correspond to the OECD
Model and is based on the same principles.211
However, some differences do exist. The Swedish definition of PE does not include a
minimum construction PE threshold. Furthermore, a PE is constituted where a real estate is
classified as inventory. Like the Finnish definition, a negative list or provisions on parent–
subsidiary relationship are not included in the domestic law definition. Altogether, these
discrepancies with the OECD Model are minor and mainly of a formal character.212
To other respects, the Swedish Income Tax Act is more unambiguous than its Finnish
counterpart. Pursuant to Chapter 6 Section 11, entities with limited tax liability are liable to
pay tax on “income from a permanent establishment or real estate in Sweden”.213 In
consequence, the threshold for source state taxation is clearly linked to the constitution of a
PE in Sweden.
Most importantly, Chapter 2 Section 29 of the Swedish Income Tax Act includes an agency
PE provision and an independent agent exception similar to Articles 5(5) and 5(6) of the
OECD Model. Interpretation of the provisions also adheres the OECD’s approach. Also, in
Swedish domestic legislation, the provisions are considered an alternative to the general PE
rule. This means that under certain circumstances a PE can be created without a fixed place
of business.214 Therefore, an agency PE is created by virtue of the agent’s activities.
3.4 EU law
The concept of PE is also used for other purposes than determining the source state threshold
for taxation of business profits. What comes to PE-avoiding functions of the commissionaire
209 In Swedish, Inkomstskattelag (1999:1229).
210 In Swedish, ”fast driftställe”.
211 See RP 1986/87:30; Glansberg 2009, p. 610.
212 For discrepancies see Glansberg 2009, pp. 610–630.
213 Chapter 6 Section 7 of the Swedish Income Tax Act stipulates that foreign legal persons have a limited tax
liability.
214 Glansberg 2009, p. 626.
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distributor model, current EU law definitions of PE are not material. In practice, the source
state threshold for taxation of business profits is determined in accordance with DTCs.
However, the legislative solutions chosen by EU policy-makers are of interest in this context.
3.4.1 CCCTB
In October 2016, the European Commission published a proposal for a Directive on a
common corporate tax base.215 In essence, the common consolidated corporate tax base
(CCCTB), which also includes a proposal for a directive on tax base consolidation, is a set
of rules to calculate MNEs’ taxable base in the EU.216 If implemented, MNEs in scope would
have to file only one tax return within the EU and the base for income taxation would be
determined on a EU level.217 The taxable profits would be then shared in accordance with
an apportionment formula between the Member States, in which the MNE is active. The
share of profits determined under the apportionment formula would be taxed at a national
rate. The CCCTB also includes a PE concept. However, the definition covers only PEs
situated within the EU and belonging to a taxpayer who is resident for tax purposes within
the EU.
In essence, Articles 5(4) and 5(5) of the CCCTB reproduce the substance of Action 7. Some
minor technical differences do exist. Specifically, differences in the order of provisions and
technical differences in terms can be identified. Furthermore, the definition of “closely
related” enterprises in Article 5(5)(b) of the Directive on a common corporate tax base does
not include the substantive definition of closely related person stating that a closely related
person exists where “based on all the relevant facts and circumstances, one has control of
the other or both are under the control of the same persons or enterprises”. Therefore, the
scope of the CCCTBs independent agent exception is slightly narrower. However, this
discrepancy should not have material effect in practice.
215 COM(2016) 685 final.
216 COM(2016) 683 final.
217 Pursuant to Article 2(1)(c), the Directive would only apply to groups with a total consolidated group revenue
exceeding EUR 750 000 000.
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3.4.2 Interest and Royalties Directive and Parent–Subsidiary Directive
The Interest and Royalties Directive also includes a definition of PE, which has been
implemented into LähdeVL (627/1978) in Finland.218 The Interest and Royalties Directive
is designed to eliminate withholding tax obstacles on intra-group cross-border interest and
royalty payments. The directive abolishes withholding taxes on interest and royalty
payments. A similar definition is also included in the Parent–Subsidiary Directive.219
Article 3(c) of the Interest and Royalties Directive and Article 2(b) of the Parent–Subsidiary
Directive, defining the term PE, read as follows:
‘[P]ermanent establishment’ means a fixed place of business situated in a
Member State through which the business of a company of another Member
State is wholly or partly carried on…
The wording is identical to that of Article 5(1) of the OECD Model with two differences.
The definition requires that the “fixed place of business” is situated in a EU Member State
and replaces the word “enterprise” with the definition “company of another Member State”.
These differences shall be considered mainly of a formal character relating to the scope of
application of the Directives. The Parent–Subsidiary Directive includes an additional
subject-to-tax condition, which relates to the anti-avoidance objectives of the Directive. The
definition implemented in Section 3(e)(1) of LähdeVL, reproduces the exact wording of the
Article 3(c) of the Interest and Royalties Directive.220
It is noteworthy, that the Directives or LähdeVL does not include a negative list or reference
to agents. Firstly, no agency PE can be constituted for the purposes of the Interest and
Royalties Directive or Parent–Subsidiary Directive. The agent’s activities would have to
fulfill the requirements of the general PE rule in order to get protection from the Directive.
Secondly, where the requirements of the general PE rule are fulfilled, the scope of
application is broad because preparatory or auxiliary activities are not excluded.
In conclusion, the PE concept in the Directives and LähdeVL operates rather differently as
compared to Article 5 of the OECD Model or Section 13(a) of the TVL. Therefore, the
218 Council Directive 2003/49/EC of 3 June 2003 on a common system of taxation applicable to interest and
royalty payments made between associated companies of different Member States.
219 Council Directive 2011/96/EU of 30 November 2011 on the common system of taxation applicable in the
case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States.
220 The Finnish translation of the Interest and Royalties Directive uses the words “jonka kautta”, meaning
“through which”. However, the definition in LähdeVL uses the Finnish term “josta”. Such difference does not
change the meaning of the provision.
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legislative solutions chosen do not, in the author’s view, serve as a good guide for domestic
law provisions regarding the PE threshold. In most cases, the taxpayer’s interests are
opposite in these two situations. The taxpayer would prefer avoiding the constitution of PE
for the purposes of business income taxation, however, falling within scope of the Directives
would be usually preferred.
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4 Implementation of the New Agency PE Threshold
4.1 International level
4.1.1 EU measures to counter BEPS
In tandem with the BEPS actions of the OECD and G20, EU Member States have put
forward efforts to fight aggressive tax planning. The EU Commission has preferred common
solutions among the Member States to fight tax planning. Therefore, an Anti-Tax Avoidance
Package has been issued, which most importantly includes the proposal for an Anti-Tax
Avoidance Directive (ATAD).221 However, issues relating to PE-avoiding schemes have not
been considered suitable for the ATAD. In the Commission’s view, they relate more to tax
treaties.222 Regardless, the Commission has set forth a Recommendation on the
implementation of measures relating to permanent establishments. 223
The Commission’s recommendation settles for encouraging Member States to implement
the proposed amendments to PE provisions in their DTCs. Conversely, Member States are
not obliged to implement the new agency PE provisions. Hence, it is possible that despite
the significant efforts of OECD and G20, the PE threshold will remain as is in some EU
Member States.
4.1.2 MLI
The proposals in Action 7 have recently taken a major leap forward, after OECD released
the text of the MLI, which has been developed under OECD BEPS Action 15. As of 24
November 2016, more than 100 jurisdictions have concluded negotiations on the instrument
and are likely to implement the instrument to some extent.
The MLI will operate in a significantly different manner as compared to traditional
amending protocols to single DTCs. The MLI will not directly amend current DTC texts.
Instead, it will add an additional layer on top of existing DTCs and work alongside them.
221 Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that
directly affect the functioning of the internal market.
222 European Commission 2016a, p. 6.
223 European Commission 2016b.
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Therefore, where implemented, the provisions of the MLI will supersede current DTC
provisions only to the extent that those provisions are covered by the provisions of the MLI.
The adoption of the MLI does not necessarily mean that the PE provisions in actual DTCs
will be amended. Firstly, even though the MLI covers Action 7 proposals, these proposals
are not included in the instrument’s minimum standard. A state signing the MLI will be able
to satisfy the minimum requirements without affecting current PE provisions of the state
concerned. Secondly, the provisions included in the MLI will only apply to a specific DTC
after all parties to that treaty have deposited an instrument of ratification and certain
transition periods have passed. To this end, states also have the option to opt-out of certain
provisions.
The MLI will be open for signature as of the beginning of 2017. A signing ceremony will be
held in Paris on 5 June 2017. Projections are that first signatures will be received at the
ceremony. The MLI will enter into force at the beginning of the fourth month after five
countries have ratified it.224 With regard to each signatory, the MLI will enter into force at
the beginning of the fourth month after the instrument of ratification is deposited. Certain
notifications are also due at the time of signature or when depositing the instrument of
ratification. Entry into force will not mean immediate effectiveness. Rather, provisions on
taxes other than withholding taxes, will come into effect on the beginning of a taxable period
after a period of six calendar months has expired after entry into force by all parties to a
specific DTC. Therefore, if no signatures are received before the signing ceremony in June,
the new provisions on PEs would become effective at the earliest for the taxable period
beginning on 1 January 2019.225
The relevant provisions with regard to the agency PE threshold are those included in Articles
12 and 15 of the MLI. Article 12(1) of the MLI reproduces the substance of Article 5(5)
proposed in Action 7, with certain technical modifications.226 Similarly, Article 12(2) of the
MLI corresponds to Article 5(6)(a) proposed in Action 7. Action 7 Article 5(6)(b) is
reproduced in Article 15(1) of the MLI.
224 See OECD 2016.
225 If the entry into effect has happened by 30 June 2018, the first taxable period where the new agency PE
provisions will apply is the period beginning 1 January 2019. Therefore, the deposition of the instrument of
ratification by all parties must have happened at the latest on 30 February 2018.
226 See Para. 159 of the Explanatory Statement to the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related
Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, 24 November 2016 (Explanatory Statement).
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Article 12(3) indicates the provisions which the new agency PE rule and independent agent
exception shall replace. Article 12(3)(a) of the MLI reads as follows:
Paragraph 1 shall apply in place of provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement
that describe the conditions under which an enterprise shall be deemed to have
a permanent establishment in a Contracting Jurisdiction (or a person shall be
deemed to be a permanent establishment in a Contracting Jurisdiction) in
respect of an activity which a person other than an agent of an independent
status undertakes for the enterprise, but only to the extent that such provisions
address the situation in which such person has, and habitually exercises, in
that Contracting Jurisdiction an authority to conclude contracts in the name
of the enterprise.
Without doubt, Article 12(1) will replace DTC articles in line with the current OECD Model
Article 5(5). Article 12(3)(b) reads as follows:
Paragraph 2 shall apply in place of provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement
that provide that an enterprise shall not be deemed to have a permanent
establishment in a Contracting Jurisdiction in respect of an activity which an
agent of an independent status undertakes for the enterprise.
Therefore, Article 12(2) will replace DTC articles in line with the current OECD Model
Article 5(6). In addition, where countries have chosen to implement Article 12(2), Article
15(1) of the MLI will apply.227
Unlike some articles of the MLI, Article 12 does not provide alternative options. A country
may either implement both the new agency PE rule and the independent agent exception or
choose to opt-out of both. Partial implementation is not possible. For the sake of clarity, the
adopted approach is coherent.
In conclusion, the circumstance that countries may opt-out of the new agency PE provision
and the independent agent exception is significant. New PE provisions will only apply to
DTCs if the parties to a specific DTC reach mutual understanding and both agree to
implement the MLI without reservations about the new agency PE provisions. Therefore, it
is highly unlikely that such unanimity will be achieved with all tax treaty states. Rather, it is
presumable that the current OECD Model and established practice thereto will remain
relevant to a significant extent. The following diagram provides a simplification of the
situations where new Action 7 agency PE provisions apply after the treaty has become
effective (Diagram 4).
227 See first sentence of Article 15(1) of the MLI.
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Diagram 4
4.1.3 Arguments for and against implementation
Countries participating in the MLI, Finland included, must now carry out an urgent review
of their DTC network and notify their final position by the time the instruments of ratification
are deposited.228 Until further information is provided on the countries’ positions, taxpayers
will have to stand by and see which DTCs will be affected.
Pro et contra arguments can be easily presented on which position should be taken with
regard to amending the PE threshold. Some key arguments in the view of the author are
presented and evaluated in the following.
In accordance with the underlying principle expressed by the OECD, companies should pay
taxes in the country where profits are generated. Policy-makers generally consider
commissionaire arrangements as artificial avoidance schemes that were put in place to erode
the taxable base of the state where sales took place. If such view is accepted, lowering the
agency PE threshold to cover commissionaire arrangements seems a rational and justifiable
BEPS-countering measure.
228 See Article 29 of the MLI.
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The principle of neutrality in taxation requires that enterprises carrying out the same
activities via dependent agents in a customer jurisdiction should be subjected to the same
tax treatment, regardless if they conclude contracts on behalf of a principal “in the name of
the enterprise” or in their own name.229 Obviously, as established European case law shows,
the current OECD Model definition does not conform to this principle.
Even though the argument on the principle of neutrality can be accepted and even considered
rather convincing, there are some shortcomings to the argument. A commissionaire is a
hybrid between an agent and a title-taking distributor. Therefore, it is not self-explanatory
whether the commissionaire distributor should be compared to a dependent agent or a LRD.
If compared to a LRD, the neutrality argument will not be sufficient justification. A LRD
will not constitute a PE either. Actually, the taxable profit of a LRD is very similar to that
of the commissionaire. Both entities are acting as local distributors in their own name. This
conclusion would justify comparison to LRDs in neutrality considerations.
On the contra side, typical taxpayer arguments include the uncertainty of tax treatment,
additional compliance costs for internationally operating companies, additional
administrative burden, more disputes with tax authorities and risk of double taxation.230
These arguments are somewhat convincing and true at least in jurisdictions where supreme
courts have established a consistent praxis or tax authorities have not scrutinized standard
commissionaire arrangements, such as in Finland. In these jurisdictions, uncertainty will
definitely increase if new agency PE provisions with substantive conditions are adopted.
However, in other jurisdictions, even prior to implementation of Action 7, tax authorities
have successfully challenged commissionaire arrangements and achieved substance-over-
form interpretations on existing OECD Model agency PE provisions.231 Even where such
interpretations may be highly questionable, choosing not to implement new PE provisions
will not take away uncertainty and PE risk. It is highly likely that uncertainty will, in fact,
increase as a substance-over-form approach begins to prevail in other areas of international
taxation.
229 See Skaar 1991, p. 488.
230 See OECD 2015a and OECD 2015c on the stakeholder comments on Action 7.
231 See Jiménez 2016 on the expansive interpretation of Article 5 of the OECD Model, in recent Spanish case
law.
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From a tax revenue perspective, changes to the PE threshold might cause a shift of tax
revenues between states. Depending on whether commissionaire arrangements are more
widely exploited by companies resident in Finland, operating in other tax treaty countries,
or by non-residents operating via commissionaire arrangement in Finland, the lower PE
threshold will either have a positive or negative impact on tax revenues. This of course
assuming that additional PEs will result in more taxable profits, which is far from self-
evident.232
Finland is a country with an export-dependent economy, where MNEs which are engaged in
the sale of goods reside. Consequently, it is well-known that Finnish companies have put in
place commissionaire arrangements to distribute goods abroad, which makes source state
taxation rather limited for the MNE concerned.233 There is very little double taxation to be
eliminated in the residence state and profits are largely taxable by the Finnish state. In case
the PE threshold is lowered, the companies’ sales activities via commissionaires might
constitute PEs. In consequence, a shift of tax revenues from Finland to other source
jurisdictions is possible.
The argument on tax revenues falls short on the lack of comprehensive data to back the
argument. Furthermore, with regard to any argument presented above, it must be taken into
account that taxpayers will almost certainly reassess and change their corporate and
contractual structures as consequence of amendments to the PE threshold. For example, the
commissionaire distributor can be changed to a LRD structure in very little time. Such
conversion could be simply done by amending intra-group contracts. Therefore, the
taxpayers’ reactions to new rules will determine whether policy objectives are reached and
whether tax revenues are shifted to other jurisdictions.
4.2 Compatibility of the new agency PE provisions
4.2.1 Compatibility with domestic law provisions
Compatibility of the national PE concept with concepts included in DTCs has not been
drawn much attention to in Finland. Traditionally, such question has not been considered
232 Comprehensive data on the extent that commissionaire arrangements are used by Finnish-based MNEs is
not available. The matter would have to be further studied in order to make further conclusions.
233 It must be borne in mind that MNEs may operate with highly complex structures. Avoidance of PE status
is only one component in the entire structure.
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highly relevant, due to the fact that the PE concepts in DTCs and the TVL have been found
similar enough. Furthermore, where the PE constitution is not considered a precondition for
levying a tax on a non-resident entity, compatibility is not a key question either.
Considering that the implementation of the MLI will lower the PE threshold for agency PEs
and in consequence agency PEs will be constituted on basis of an ever more artificial nexus,
compatibility issues may raise. The new agency PE provisions set forth in Action 7 provide
that where the commissionaire plays the “principal role leading to the conclusion of
contracts” or concludes contracts for the “transfer of the ownership” of the principal’s
products, a PE may be constituted. In essence, the rule deems that sufficient coordination
exists in these situations and in consequence, a PE is constituted. Now that a certain extent
of deemed coordination between the commissionaire and the principal will be a sufficient
nexus, a MNE might run into a situation where its activities constitute a PE under the new
agency PE rule set forth in Action 7 and implemented through the MLI. However, in case
the national PE concept is not amended, the same activities may not meet the national PE
threshold. Section 13(a) of the TVL does not recognize such an artificial nexus. In fact, it
does not include any specific agency PE provisions.
Section 13(a) is built on the fundamental principle that the “term permanent establishment
means a place”—no alternative nexus is mentioned. With regard to commissionaire
distributors, the PE threshold in Section 13(a) may not be met where the commissionaire
does not have a specific place “where special measures have been taken”, such as a
permanent place of sales. In fact, in most circumstances, it is highly unlikely that such
“place” would exist. Many commissionaires operate without a physical presence in a single
location.
Such non-compatibility is unlikely to directly result in the conclusion that the business
income of the enterprise is not taxable in Finland. As mentioned, tax liability for business
income of a foreign enterprise covers any Finnish-sourced income. However, compatibility
issues are likely to occur on a more systemic level. Firstly, determining Finnish-sourced
income is far from unambiguous. Therefore, the domestic PE concept serves as a practical
guideline for determining where income is, in fact, derived from Finland.234 Furthermore,
domestic PE rules have been traditionally interpreted in accordance with the PE provisions
234 In practice, such use of the PE concept is likely customary. The circumstance that the domestic PE concept
is a de facto precondition for the taxation of foreign enterprises’ income supports this assumption.
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in current DTCs.235 Now that the measures to counter BEPS are implemented through the
MLI, the interpretation of the PE threshold in some tax treaties may be affected. Interpreting
the domestic PE provisions in accordance with the new BEPS compatible rules would be a
total disregard of the principle of legality and should not be accepted in any circumstances.
It cannot be accepted that amendments in tax treaties, which cannot be read from the
domestic act, would amend the meaning of a domestic law provision. However, tax praxis
has shown that authorities have a tendency to adhere the OECD’s rules in interpretation—
authorities even tend to anticipate forthcoming amendments. As Jiménez (2016) has shown,
this is not a futile or far-fetched concern.236 Such tendency can already be seen in European
jurisdictions, even prior to the MLI entering into force. Therefore, a risk of tax authorities’
interpretations in contradiction with the principle of legality is a relevant concern.
Secondly, it could be reasonably argued that the unclear provisions and relationship of
Section 10(1) Point 2 and Section 13(a) are not in line with the emphasized principle of
legality. Section 81 of the Finnish Constitution requires that state tax is governed by accurate
and precise provisions.237 The current threshold for source state taxation can hardly fulfill
these requirements.
This level of incoherence between the domestic concept and tax treaty PE concept is by no
means appropriate. Non-uniformity may lead to unforeseen situations and create uncertainty
among taxpayers. Therefore, an updated PE concept and clarifications to the TVL are
needed.
4.2.2 De lege ferenda: Adoption of a stripped PE rule and other amendments to the TVL
In order to maximize tax revenues, a low threshold for purposes of foreign enterprises’
income taxation is in the states’ interest. To achieve such threshold, countries have chosen
to adopt broad PE concepts in domestic legislations. Section 13(a) of the TVL is no different.
Where a broad national PE concept stipulating a low income tax threshold is adopted, the
domestic law provisions seldom have much relevance. Countries have comprehensive DTC
networks. In consequence, the number of non-treaty situations is very limited. In general,
235 The government proposal HE 76/1995 suggests that PE rules should be interpreted in accordance with
provisions of DTCs.
236 See Jiménez 2016, pp. 472–473.
237 See Chapter 1.5.1.
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non-treaty situations where PE considerations are relevant relate to companies established
in tax havens. Other regimes, such as CFC rules, are in place to tackle such arrangements.
Therefore, in most cases, the application of DTCs is the most significant factor in
determining the extent of source state taxation. Regardless of the aforementioned, also
domestic rules must allow taxation, as stressed earlier. Therefore, DTC provisions and
domestic rules have to conform to a relevant extent. Even though current TVL provisions
are unsatisfactory, such endeavor can also be read from the Finnish preparatory works. The
government proposal HE 76/1995 suggests that PE rules should be interpreted in accordance
with DTC provisions.238
To ensure compatibility, Sweden has chosen to implement the exact wording of the OECD
Model to the Swedish Income Tax Act. Due to the recent developments in tax treaty law,
the Swedish provisions are no longer optimal and may require certain amendments.
However, in the author’s view, such general approach best fulfills the principles of legality
and best promotes legal certainty.
De lege ferenda, the new PE provisions set forth in Action 7 should be implemented in their
broadest possible form into the Finnish TVL. The paragraphs do not need to be copied in
entirety. However, the key building blocks should be included. An outline of a satisfactory
PE provision is laid down hereunder.
Firstly, it is only rational to include the general PE rule set forth in Article 5(1). Furthermore,
a list of positive examples similar to Article 5(2), should be included. For reasons of clarity,
the positive list could be supplemented with additional examples. However, in a similar
manner to the OECD Model, examples should always be subject to the conditions set forth
in the general PE rule. Secondly, for the sake of clarity, the construction PE should be
included as well. However, the domestic construction PE rule could be implemented without
a specific 6 or 12-month threshold, thus adopting the construction PE rule in a broader form.
To further broaden the application of the construction PE, a wording similar to the UN
Model, including assembly projects and supervisory activities carried out in connection with
construction projects, could be implemented without compatibility issues. Thirdly, the
exceptions laid down in Article 5(4) of the OECD Model would not necessarily need to be
implemented. Such option would ensure the broadest possible application of the domestic
238 See HE 76/1995 vp, p. 19.
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law PE concept and would not limit the application of the general PE and agency PE rule.
In any case, interpretation in accordance with the Commentary requires a certain level of
permanency or habitual activity for PE constitution.
Similarly, the new agency PE rule set forth in Article 5(5) of Action 7 should be included in
the domestic law definition. Again, to ensure the broadest possible interpretation, the phrase
“contracts that are routinely concluded without material modification by the enterprise”
would not need to be included. As mentioned, a UN committee has observed, that such
phrase might be adversely limiting the scope of application of the agency PE. Finally, the
contents of Article 5(7) of the OECD Model do not necessarily need to be copied to a
domestic law definition. Established Finnish doctrine provides that as a starting point,
separate entities are to be taxed independently.
In conclusion, the new stripped Article 5 would include the essential parts of the PE concept
set forth in Action 7, without adversely limiting the scope of application. Because the new
PE provisions set forth in Action 7 can be considered way broader than those of the current
OECD Model, compatibility issues should not occur even in situations where the MLI would
not apply and the current DTC provisions would remain relevant. Unlike with the current
Section 13(a), under the proposed wording, the legislator’s ambition to interpret domestic
law provisions similarly to provisions of DTCs would actually be possible.
As mentioned above, the current wording of Section 13(a) is not the only sub-satisfactory
part of the current TVL. For the reasons of clarity and certainty, other amendments are also
necessary. At least with regard to limited liability companies, the Finnish peculiarity of
dividing income to different sources appears outdated. To this end, the Finish Ministry of
Finance has already initiated an action and appointed a group of experts to support drafting
new provisions, which would end the division of limited liability companies’ income into
different income sources.239 However, division into different sources of income is a minor
issue. More importantly, for reasons of clarity, it would be advisable to set the constitution
of a PE as a precondition for levying a tax on the business income of a non-resident entity.240
239 Ministry of Finance 2016.
240 Nissinen 2010 p. 197 has proposed that Section 83 of the VML would be transferred to the TVL, for the
sake of clarity. Pursuant to the Section, a tax may be levied on the income of a non-resident entity, which is
engaged in business activities, even where a Finnish PE does not exist. In this study, the Swedish alternative
is preferred over Nissinen’s proposal, because it provides more certainty for taxpayers. Interpretation of PE
provisions is more predictable and better fulfills the principle of legality than attempting to separately define
the threshold where a company “engages in business activities”.
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Such approach has been adopted in Sweden. It would clear out the current uncertainty
without having much—if any—effect on tax revenues. However, such clarification would
provide much more certainty for non-resident taxpayers.
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5 Concluding Remarks
5.1 Implications of the new PE rules on commissionaire distributor models
The new lowered agency PE threshold will change the operating environment of the
commissionaire distributor model. Even though commissionaire distributors will continue
to conclude contracts in the name of the commissionaire and contracts will remain binding
only on the commissionaire itself, the new agency PE provisions almost certainly exclude
the possibility to rely on any formal interpretation thereof and to consequently avoid PE
constitution.
Even under the new agency PE rule, Article 5(5) and 5(6) of the OECD Model will not
represent dichotomy. The two paragraphs are not mutually exclusive, meaning that not all
agents are either dependent or independent. Therefore, dependency does not certainly
constitute a PE for the principal. Regardless, it appears that the OECD and G20 have
achieved their goal to reform the agency PE provisions. Under the new provisions, all key
conditions for agency PE constitution are of substantive character, rather than formal. Under
the new substance-over-form rules, the commissionaire distributor model is likely to have a
PE-constituting effect on the principal.
As one might expect, PE constitution for the principal entity is very likely a sub-optimal
circumstance for a MNE. Commissionaire structures have been put in place to serve the
opposite purpose. Firstly, the MNEs tax exposure in the customer jurisdiction may increase
as the attribution of profits under Article 7 of the OECD Model is required where a PE exists.
Secondly, additional compliance and administrative costs will result in many areas. As
mentioned, PE constitution will trigger various compliance requirements all the way from
filing a start-up notification and income tax returns to completing and maintaining
accounting records for the PE’s transactions. The paradox is that the commissionaire must
already fulfill all local compliance requirements. Therefore, PE status in tandem with a local
entity will result in burdensome compliance requirements that must be fulfilled twice in one
jurisdiction.
As the new PE provisions are substantive, rather than formal, uncertainty may also increase.
At least where operating models vary from traditional alternatives, such as the
commissionaire distributor model, the substantive agency PE conditions which allow leeway
in interpretation, may not be interpreted consistently in both the residence state and the
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source state or any other state where the MNE operates. This is because many terms are not
explicitly defined in the MLI or the Commentary, thus left to be interpreted in accordance
with the domestic laws of the state concerned. In consequence, disputes with tax authorities
are likely to become more frequent and the risk of double taxation is higher. However, the
double taxation will not result from PE status itself. To this end, profit allocation and
elimination of double taxation are key.
Even though profit allocation to PEs is not in the scope of this study, certain preliminary
conclusions can be drawn. For an existing commissionaire distributor model, PE constitution
will certainly become an additional administrative burden. However, added tax exposure for
the MNE in the customer jurisdiction is not inevitable. Even where a PE will be constituted
for the principal, the activities performed will not have changed. Where the commissionaire
is already remunerated on an arm’s length basis, there may not be any additional profit
attributable to the MNEs activities in the customer jurisdiction. However, as many
commentators have claimed, the attribution of profits analysis under Article 7 of the OECD
Model is less certain than TP analysis. This may cause some variation in profit allocation.241
However, in general, profit allocated to the customer jurisdiction should not drastically
change in consequence of PE constitution.
Despite the risks related to the new agency PE provisions, MNEs will not be crippled. Firstly,
it is to be kept in mind that the new agency PE provisions introduced under Action 7 will
certainly not cover all existing tax treaties. Countries may opt-out of the new agency PE
provision and the independent agent exception, even where the MLI is signed. New PE
provisions will only apply to DTCs if the parties to a specific DTC reach mutual
understanding and both agree to implement the MLI without reservations concerning the
new agency PE provisions. It is highly unlikely that such unanimity will be achieved with
all tax treaty states. Rather, it is presumable that the current OECD Model and established
practice thereto will remain relevant to some extent.
5.2 Treaty shopping
Where the new agency PE provisions are implemented, MNEs will be urged to take action.
In order to keep the operating model agile, to minimize uncertainty, and to retain beneficial
241 For example, see EY’s comments on the Public Discussion Draft at OECD 2015a, p.237.
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treatment, certain options are available. Firstly, the new agency PE provisions introduced
under Action 7 will only cover tax treaties which states have specified together, in consensus,
and where either country has not opted out from the new PE provisions. Therefore, it is likely
that DTCs with some states will remain as is.
These circumstances enable tax planning to a certain extent and may encourage treaty
shopping. With regard to existing commissionaire distributor models, which are not intended
to be changed, the objective is to fall under the application of a DTC with old agency PE
provisions, i.e. rules in force currently. Application of old agency PE rule can be achieved
by establishing the SalesCo, i.e. the entity acting as the principal, in a country with a
beneficial DTC with the customer jurisdiction. Treaty shopping may not even require
establishing new entities. Practically any operative entity within the group may be appointed
as the new principal, for example, an existing full-fledged distributing company. Where the
commissionaire is acting on behalf of the SalesCo in a country which is not implementing
the MLI, PE constitution should not occur.
In conclusion, the new Action 7, which has been designed to counter schemes relating to the
artificial avoidance of PE status, is likely to encourage rather than discourage treaty
shopping. Where treaty shopping is possible for the MNE concerned, the new PE provisions
will only add an additional factor to be considered in finding the most beneficial jurisdiction
for the entity acting as the SalesCo.
Treaty shopping may not be the optimal long-term solution for MNEs. Rather, it is likely
that tax authorities will continue to aggressively scrutinize commissionaire arrangements.
Therefore, also other reactions ought to be contemplated.
5.3 Operating model alternatives
The commissionaire distributor model is a light and rather agile structure which can be
restructured with relative ease. In case operations in the customer jurisdictions remain
consistent, avoiding PE status continues to be in the MNE’s interest, and treaty shopping is
not feasible or practical, conversion to a LRD is possible.
Conversion from a commissionaire distributor to a LRD would simply require an
amendment to intra-group contracts. In essence, the contract terms should be amended so
that the title to the products is transferred to the entity in the customer jurisdiction before the
transfer to the local customer. After conversion, the products sold would be entered as assets
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to the entity’s books. In fact, little change in the actual operations would occur, where the
contract terms would give the entity a flash title. Hence, in the eyes of the customer, the
operations of the entity in the customer jurisdiction would not change. The products could
continue to be directly shipped from another company in the group to the customer of the
LRD, by virtue of a drop shipment arrangement. Therefore, taking title would not require
activities such as logistics and warehousing to be carried on by the entity itself. Extensive
re-financing of the entity would not be required either, where the LRD would only be
required to pay for its purchases after it collected its own receivables from customers, and
where the intra-group prices of goods are flexibly set, thus guaranteeing a gross margin
return to the LRD. However, some additional administrative costs, such as tax and legal
consultants’ fees, would certainly incur in connection with a conversion.
With regard to the PE status of the LRD, Action 7 not only targets avoidance of PE status
through the use of commissionaire structures but also “similar strategies” are in focus. The
Final Report defines “similar strategies” as strategies in which contracts are substantially
negotiated in a state and concluded abroad or strategies which exploit the independent agent
exception set forth in Article 5(6) of the OECD Model.242
The PE status of an LRD was discussed to some extent during the drafting process of Action
7. Many stakeholder comments brought up the LRDs’ PE status as well. This uncertainty
was considered in the Revised Discussion Draft, which stated that “similar strategies” do not
include LRD arrangements.243 The same conclusion was reproduced in the Final Report.244
The Commentary to the new agency PE rule clarifies that a buy–sell distributor in a particular
market is not considered to be acting “on behalf of an enterprise” when it sells products
bought from an enterprise. Furthermore, the proposed Commentary goes on to clarify that
LRDs, which would hold the title to the property and buy the product from an associated
enterprise, would also be regarded as not acting “on behalf of an enterprise”.245 In addition,
LRDs would not fulfill the decisive requirement set forth in Article 5(5)(b) and clarified in
Paragraph 32.10 of the proposed Commentary. In order to constitute a PE, it is required that
products owned by the principal are sold by the person acting on behalf of the enterprise.246
242 OECD 2015d, p. 15.
243 Ibid., p. 5.
244 Ibid., p. 15.
245 Para. 32.12 of the proposed Commentary. OECD 2015, p. 21.
246 Para. 32.10 of the proposed Commentary. OECD 2015, pp. 20–21.
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Clearly, an LRD is selling products owned by itself. Considering these clarifications together
with the underlying principle set forth in Article 5(7) of the OECD Model, which stipulates
that different legal entities are taxed separately regardless of parent–subsidiary relationship,
it can be concluded that LRDs should not constitute PEs.
As the “on behalf of” condition is a prerequisite for agency PE constitution also under the
new agency PE provisions, the correct interpretation is that where the title to the products
sold is passed to the distributor in the customer jurisdiction, an agency PE is not constituted
for the distribution activities concerned. However, the Commentary’s clarification does not
entail that tax authorities would not scrutinize LRD structures as well. Even though the
correct interpretation of the new agency PE provisions suggest that a PE should not be
constituted, it is likely that the TP between the LRD and related companies within the same
group is subject to scrutiny. In fact, Action 9 of the BEPS Action Plan specifically targets
the contractual transfer of risks between associated enterprises. Far-reaching conclusions on
whether LRD structures are beneficial for a specific MNE cannot be made in this context.
Instead, further research on the matter would be required to draw conclusions.
Other restructuring alternatives are also available. In case avoiding PE status is in the MNEs
interest, conversion to an MSC might be feasible as well. However, to be able to avoid PE
status in such structure, the operations in the customer jurisdiction would have to be scaled
down. This could not be done without the operations changes becoming evident to
customers. To avoid playing the “principal role leading to the conclusion of the contracts”
in accordance with the new Article 5(5), the MSC could only engage in marketing activities
which would not directly result in the conclusion of contracts between the foreign principal
and the customer. The MSC would have to operate in the somewhat gray area of carrying
out marketing activities without directly leading to the conclusion of contracts. Therefore, it
is unlikely that restructurings other than a conversion to a LRD would be possible without
changes in the actual operations in the customer jurisdiction.
5.4 Conclusion
Regardless of whether commissionaire distributor arrangements are considered artificial by
their very nature or regarded fully acceptable, a PE should not be constituted under the
current provisions of the OECD and UN Models where the commissionaire agreement and
the commissionaire’s activities correspond to the true nature and characteristics of a
commissionaire–principal relationship. Such conclusion can be drawn from the
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interpretation of the current agency PE provision in Article 5(5) and the respective well-
established European case law, wherein a literal, form-over-substance interpretation has
been preferred. In consequence, a MNE is able to exploit a commissionaire structure in its
distribution so that sales profits are not subject to income taxation in the customer
jurisdiction. Consequently, profits are effectively shifted to the country where the principal
entity resides.
The forthcoming changes to tax treaty law will change the established notion. The
implementation of the MLI will likely have a PE-constituting effect on commissionaire
distributor arrangements. Such effect will most importantly result in an increase in the
MNE’s administrative burden. As the MLI allows for countries to opt-out of the new agency
PE provisions set forth in Action 7, the current notion will remain relevant to some extent.
Countries’ positions, which have yet to be made public, will determine the extent to which
the commissionaire distributor model will be able to avoid PE constitution in the future.247
The schedule of implementation also remains unknown. It is likely that the new PE
provisions will come into effect at the beginning of the year 2019, at the earliest.
Even where the MLI will not apply on top of an existing DTC, the new agency PE provisions
in accordance with Action 7 may become relevant in the mid-to long-term. Firstly, the new
post-BEPS OECD Model is likely to become an established basis for the negotiation of
future DTCs, after the OECD and UN Models are updated and adhere to Action 7. Secondly,
where EU level harmonization of direct taxation increases, the new agency PE concept may
be included in EU law. First indications of such developments can be read from the proposal
for a CCCTB, which already includes an agency PE concept adhering to the definition
included in the MLI.
Where the new agency PE provisions do apply, reactive options are available for MNEs.
Firstly, the configuration of the MLI will encourage treaty shopping. Secondly, the most
common response to the forthcoming amendments is likely to be a conversion from a
commissionaire distributor to a LRD. The implications of Action 9 of the OECD BEPS
should be further studied to determine whether LRD structures under the MLI will allow for
similar profit shifting as the current treaty provisions. That being said, realignment of
247 According to most recent news from the UK, it appears that the UK will not be adopting the new agency
PE provisions in their DTCs. However, the British government has not publicly confirmed this position. See
Bloomberg 2016.
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taxation and relevant substance or revival of source state taxation will not be achieved with
the new definition of PE. In a metaphorical sense, tax treaties will continue to function like
a bathtub—“a single leaky one is a drain on a country’s [tax] revenues”.248 Because PE
constitution itself will not lead to new taxable income where risks and activities do not
change, the amendments to profit allocation under Article 7 and the updated TP rules by
virtue of OECD BEPS Action 9, if any, are more likely to revive source state taxation.
Regardless of the limited contribution of the new definition of PE to the underlying objective
of the BEPS initiative, the forthcoming amendments are likely to cause uncertainty for
taxpayers. The legal status of a commissionaire under relevant contract law will drift ever
further apart from its status under tax law. The civil law commissionaire will continue to
enter into agreements which do not legally bind the principal. However, new agency PE
provisions will assume coordination between the commissionaire and the principal, thus
disregarding the underlying concept of the independence of legal entities set forth in Article
5(7) of the OECD Model. In this artificial legal environment, which might not correspond
with reality, profits are allocated in accordance with Article 7. On this note, the growing
concern for uncertainty and lack of predictability relating to the attribution of profits does
not seem far-fetched.
Increased uncertainty is also evident on the domestic law level. In the author’s view, the
need for uniformity of the tax system requires that provisions in national law closely
correspond to the tax treaty provisions regarding the new nexus triggering source state
taxation of business income. Therefore, the implementation of a stripped PE rule into Finnish
domestic legislation is proposed. In principle, the definition set forth in Action 7 would be
transposed to the TVL in its broadest possible form, thus stripping the new agency PE article
from provisions which limit its application. In tandem, certain existing uncertainties relating
to the threshold of business profit taxation of foreign enterprises should be resolved.
Without doubt, the forthcoming amendments to tax treaty law will cause uncertainty. What
is certain, however, is that commissionaire arrangements and other PE-avoiding and profit
shifting distribution models will not be killed off. The commissionaire distributor model will
stay in the toolbox of tax planners and remain relevant also for the years to come. Depending
248 The World Bank 2016. An insight into tax treaty law by Stephen Shay, a senior lecturer at Harvard Law
School.
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on the countries’ positions, the popularity of the said model may decrease and the preference
for LRD arrangements or similar distribution models may respectively increase.
Neither the realignment of taxation and relevant substance, a revival of source state taxation
nor inter-state equity will be materially affected by the amendments to the definition of PE
in tax treaties. Therefore, in today’s business environment, the notion of PE can hardly be
described as the single most important issue in treaty-based fiscal law any longer.249 Instead,
profit allocation and TP will be key areas in achieving these fundamental goals.
Even though the commissionaire distributor model will likely survive the forthcoming
changes in tax treaty law, MNEs must stay alert. The OECD’s lowered PE threshold is only
one tool to counter avoidance of PE status. Policy-makers’ do have other options up their
sleeve. MNEs should also pay close attention to legislative developments in the jurisdictions
they operate in. Most recently, OECD BEPS has inspired European national diverted profits
tax bills—the so-called “Google tax”. These unilateral measures, inter alia, target MNE’s
commissionaire distributor models. Diverted profits tax provisions have been recently
included in the United Kingdom Finance Act 2015. A tax is levied on an amount equal to
notional PE profits even though no PE would be created under the relevant DTC.250
Similarly, a diverted profits tax has been presented on the French Draft Finance Bill for
2017.251 Such initiatives are problematic with respect to EU law and DTCs and have yet to
be discussed in Finland. What can be concluded, however, is that if multilateral measures to
counter BEPS caused by commissionaire arrangements will not succeed, countries may be
willing to set forth strict unilateral measures to achieve policy objectives.
249 Skaar 1991, p. 1.
250 See Sections 86 and 87 of the United Kingdom Finance Act 2015, which came into effect 1 April 2015.
251 See EY 2016.
